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I. INTRODUCTION
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), 1 which represents some of the world’s largest economies,
believes computers can possibly commit crimes for which humans
could be held liable. Specifically, the OECD and its member nations
have identified algorithmic collusion 2 in oligopolistic markets as a
potential source of anticompetitive concerns. 3 However, the OECD’s
Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against
Hard Core Cartels (OECD Recommendation or Recommendation), 4
1. “The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is
a unique forum where the governments of 34 democracies with market economies
work with each other, as well as with more than 70 non-member economies to
promote economic growth, prosperity, and sustainable development. The
Organization provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences,
seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and coordinate domestic
and international policies.” What is the OECD?, U.S. MISSION TO THE ORG. FOR
ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., https://usoecd.usmission.gov/our-relationship/aboutthe-oecd/what-is-the-oecd/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
2. Antonio Capobianco et al., Algorithms and Collusion, 14 OECD (2017),
http://www.oecd.org/competition/algorithms-and-collusion.htm
(“Algorithmic
collusion consists of any form of an anti-competitive agreement or coordination
among competing firms that is facilitated or implemented through means of
automated systems.”).
3. Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], Algorithms and Collusion:
Competition Policy in the Digital Age, at 33 (2017), www.oecd.org/
competition/algorithms-collusion-competition-policy-in-the-digital-age.htm
[hereinafter Competition Policy in the Digital Age] (explaining that the current
growth in the use of algorithms combined with developments in machine learning
have induced many changes in digital markets and fueled a wide debate on what
such developments may mean for competition agencies and their enforcement
activities).
4. See generally Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], Recommendation
of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels,
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established two decades ago and adopted successfully by member and
non-member OECD nations, does not suffice to effectively promote
international comity with the novel challenges algorithmic collusion
presents to competition authorities. 5 More needs to be done to
safeguard against the risks posed by deep-learning artificial
intelligence (AI) in digital markets.
The call within the international community to close the gap in
antitrust enforcement has grown exponentially in past years, and
algorithmic collusion is no exception. 6 The OECD and its member
nations have expressed concerns and explored how their national
competition authorities are equipped to tackle this problem—if they
are even willing to assign liability to robotically created collusion. 7
Although most competition authorities around the world have
designated tacit collusion 8 as legal, it remains unclear whether that
should still be the case when implemented through AI pricing
algorithms—especially where the outcome is predictable. 9 If
OECD/LEGAL/0294,
https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/api/print?ids=193&lang
=en [hereinafter Recommendation].
5. The OECD, in a 2016 report, commented that these strategies “may pose
serious challenges to competition authorities in the future, as it may be very difficult,
if not impossible, to prove an intention to coordinate prices, at least using current
antitrust tools.” Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Org. for Econ. Cooperation &
Dev. [OECD], Algorithmic Collusion: Problems and Counter-Measures, at 19,
DAF/COMP/WD(2017)25 (May 31, 2017), https://www.oecd.org/official
documents/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%282017%2925&d
ocLanguage=En [hereinafter Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures].
6. See C. Paul Rogers III, The Incredible Shrinking Antitrust Law and the
Antitrust Gap, 52 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 67, 67 (2013) (discussing how substantive
antitrust law began shrinking in the 1970s and has steadily continued to do so).
7. See generally Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD] Directorate for
Fin. & Enter. Aff. Competition Comm., Algorithms and Collusion—Summaries of
Contributions, DAF/COMP/WD(2017)2 (June 16, 2017), www.oecd.org/daf/
competition/algorithms-and-collusion.htm (citing national reports on approaches to
algorithmic collusion submitted to the OECD for roundtable discussion);
Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 39 (highlighting challenges
in assigning liability).
8. Tacit collusion refers to decisions made in “conscious parallelism,” which in
oligopolistic markets, can lead to potentially anti-competitive coordination without
any explicit agreements. Competitors maintain this behavior by recognizing their
mutual interdependency. Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 19.
9. ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE
PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM DRIVEN ECONOMY 80 (2016) [hereinafter
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computers replace traditional cartels, 10 algorithms can be programmed
or self-learn to collect market data, monitor price variations, and
automatically retaliate against any deviation. As a result, market
equilibrium (viz. competitive output and price) could be reset (viz.
lower output and higher price) entirely “automatically.” 11 When
output adjusts through AI and the machines self-learn to collude, there
is a high probability, under current antitrust laws, that extreme
anticompetitive behavior could remain undetected and unpunished. 12
This paper covers the OECD Recommendation’s inability to
facilitate international comity and enforcement cooperation in
scenarios of AI algorithmic collusion. 13 The introduction of AI deeplearning algorithms in Part II addresses both the efficiencies and the
potential for the creation of permanent “algorithmic cartels.” 14 The
background of Part II concludes by covering the 1998 OECD legal
instrument, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective
Action Against Hard Core Cartels, and its adoption by OECD member
and non-member nations. 15 Part III highlights that the OECD
Recommendation captures the same collusive behaviors and outcomes
algorithmic collusion generates but proves insufficient to promote
international enforcement cooperation and comity in scenarios of AI
collusion. 16 This paper concludes, in Part IV, with several
EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION].
10. See Recommendation, supra note 4 (discussing the “convergence and
effectiveness of laws prohibiting hard core cartels”).
11. See Terrell McSweeny & Brian O’Dea, The Implications of Algorithmic
Pricing for Coordinated Effects Analysis and Price Discrimination Markets in
Antitrust Enforcement, 32 ANTITRUST 75, 76 (2017) (suggesting algorithmic
collusion could lead to near monopolistic pricing).
12. See Antonio Capobianco & Pedro Gonzaga, Algorithms and Competition:
Friends or Foes?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. 1 (Aug. 2017) (explaining that machine
learning and pricing algorithms allow firms to develop sophisticated strategies to
collude under the radar of competition authorities); see also McSweeny & O’Dea,
supra note 11, at 79 (noting the ability of algorithms to facilitate an increase in tacit
collusion and the lack of protection the Sherman Act offers).
13. See discussion infra Part II.
14. See id.
15. See id. (focusing on non-signatories to the agreement—China, India, and
Russia, as well as signatories to the agreement—the United States, European Union,
and Brazil (which is a nonmember state to the OECD)); see also Recommendation
supra note 4.
16. See discussion infra Part III (arguing that there will be a negative trickle-
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recommendations for the proper adoption of the OECD
Recommendation by national competition authorities in light of the
challenges algorithmic collusion poses. 17

II. BACKGROUND
This section provides background on cartels in the digital economy
and the OECD’s response. Part A introduces the problem of
interdependence among firms in oligopolistic markets and how the
proliferation of the digital economy heightens these concerns. Part B
explains how the use of algorithms, particularly AI, intensifies
existing problems in oligopolistic markets. Part C introduces the
OECD Recommendation which was intended to address these
problems.

A. DIGITIZED OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS
Economists and competition authorities face a century-old problem
with no identified adequate solution: interdependence in oligopolistic
markets. 18 When a market consists of very few sellers of homogenous
products, they may be able to set output below, and prices above, the
competitive level with no formal agreement. 19 Competitive markets
are most vulnerable to manipulation when they are highly
concentrated. 20 In these markets, economists observe high
interdependence and mutual self-awareness between sellers, which
makes parallel decision-making more likely (the so-called “oligopoly
problem”). 21 This results in tacit collusion — an undesirable outcome
down effect on international comity due to the increasing gaps in global competition
authorities’ approaches in regulating the growing presence of AI).
17. See discussion infra Part IV.
18. See Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested
Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1562 (1968) (analyzing the persistent and
difficult oligopoly problem in antitrust policy).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., id. at 1591 (recognizing that even express collusion, not only tacit,
is rarely practicable in non-oligopolistic market structures); Ashwin Ittoo & Nicolas
Petit, Algorithmic Pricing Agents and Tacit Collusion: A Technological Perspective
2 (Oct. 2, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3046405) (conceding that tacit collusion is only
sustainable in concentrated markets).
21. See Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 35 (noting efforts
of competition authorities to attempt to extend antitrust tools to address the oligopoly
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for consumers, but a profit-maximizing outcome for firms, and in most
cases entirely within the law. 22
Today’s online and data-driven economy allows for increased
market transparency and flow of information. 23 Economists recognize
problem). Essentially, this small group of sellers recognizes they are offering near
identical products for the same group of consumers and, further, are aware that
entrants are unlikely because of high barriers. They decide to act in parallel to
maximize profits and not lose their share of customers or profits. The
interdependence theory, however, is thought to be overstated in primary factual
assertions—that all players in an oligopolistic market are operating at the same or
very similar cost levels, that there is no meaningful lag time between the price cut
and the response, and that all players have the same capacity to expand. Posner,
supra note 18, at 1563-64, 1566. See also ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.
[OECD], GLOSSARY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ECONOMICS AND COMPETITION
LAW 26 (1993), http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/2376087.pdf (defining
conscious parallelism).
22. See Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 3 (recognizing that collusive
outcomes through conscious parallelism hardly amount to an antitrust violation in
any international jurisdiction — which is an incredible obstacle for competition
authorities when looking at homogenous markets); Pricing Algorithms: The Digital
Collusion Scenarios, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER 5 (2017),
https://www.freshfields.com/globalassets/our-thinking/campaigns/digital/
mediainternet/pdf/freshfields-digital---pricing-algorithms---the-digital-collusionscenarios.pdf (addressing German and French authorities’ joint report in which they
noted the lack of legal basis for any intervention by competition authorities); Bruno
Salcedo, Pricing Algorithms and Tacit Collusion 5 (Nov. 1, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript)
(on
file
with
Pennsylvania
State
University),
http://www.brunosalcedo.com/docs/collusion.pdf (noting collusion without an
explicit agreement or direct communication falls outside the scope of regulatory
framework); cf. Posner, supra note 18, at 1571 (conceding that Section 1 of the
Sherman Act under United States law was meant to deter the outcomes that tacit
collusion creates and thus should be treated as such an instrument).
23. See Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 2-3; Competition Policy in the
Digital Age, supra note 3, at 21-22; accord EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL
COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 4 (identifying market transparency and the increased
flow of information as a driver in market efficiency and shift in seller offerings and
consumer purchase behaviors). In unconcentrated markets where sellers offer
heterogeneous products, market transparency has a positive impact. See Damien
Geradin, Algorithmic Tacit Collusion and Individualized Pricing: Are Antitrust
19,
2017),
Concerns
Justified?,
6
COPENHAGEN ECON. (June
https://www.copenhageneconomics.com/dyn/resources/Filelibrary/file/6/66/14982
04706/geradin.pdf (arguing that an increase in product heterogeneity should
decrease the likelihood of tacit collusion). But see David J. Lynch, Policing the
Digital Cartels, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/9de9fb80cd23-11e6-864f-20dcb35cede2 (discussing U.S. v. Topkins, where there was a pricefixing agreement for the poster market on Amazon—a market that should have been

2019]

NEW THREAT TO COMPETITIVE MARKETS

929

the undistorted flow of information in markets as a component of
“perfect competition.” 24 Consumers no longer have to enter every bigbox store to price shop but can monitor and compare prices in real time
behind a screen, driving lower consumer search costs. 25 Sellers are
also able to communicate with consumers easier than before and
compare their offerings to competitors, creating a competitive
dynamic previously absent from the market. 26 This competitive
dynamic drives more entry by reducing barriers—a brick and mortar
store is no longer necessary to enter a market where it was previously
required, traditional advertising transforms into services where sellers
only pay per click, 27 and it attracts sellers who would otherwise be
risk-averse and have an ill-perceived acuity of entry costs. 28

a poor candidate for price fixing because the products are heterogeneous and hard to
compare).
24. E.g., Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], Unilateral Disclosure of
Information with Anticompetitive Effects, at 11, DAF/COMP(2012)17 (Oct. 11,
2012), www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Unilateraldisclosureofinformation2012.pdf
(conceding perfect competition requires the existence of market transparency in
order for firms to benchmark performance and pricing alongside competitors).
25. See, e.g., EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 5
(comparing price transparency online with the effort it would take to visit 5,000
grocery stores around town—no one has time to visit every store to compare prices,
but they have time to do a single online search). In turn, consumers can dispel
irrelevant information easily and receive a far greater volume of relevant information
that was before unachievable. See McSweeny & O’Dea, supra note 11, at 75 (noting
the presence of algorithms as key to firms’ competitive behavior in the marketplace
and to deliver meaningful consumer benefits, such as product recommendations);
see also Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 15-17 (analyzing the
supply-side and demand-side efficiencies of algorithm use in business operations).
26. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 7
(recognizing that one of the promises of online markets is to more efficiently match
buyers and sellers, further promoting allocative efficiency); Ezrachi & Stucke,
Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 32 (describing firms’ ability to
undercut prices of competitors through direct communications with buyers).
27. Google AdWords is an advertising system in which advertisers bid on certain
keywords in a pay-per-click system and can reach consumers through the Google
search network or Google display network. See Jacob Baadsgaard, What is Google
AdWords and Why Do I Need It?, DISRUPTIVE ADVERT. (Jan. 1, 2018),
https://www.disruptiveadvertising.com/adwords/what-is-google-adwords/.
28. E.g., EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 6-7
(identifying sellers, Airbnb and Uber, who have entered markets that otherwise
would not have without the reduced barriers where the sellers are backed by
“guarantees” which reduce the risks of entry).
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In the burgeoning digital economy, the danger of interdependence
in oligopolistic markets is heightened. 29 Competition law enforcers
find interdependence among firms in concentrated markets
undesirable, as their parallel decision-making results in tacit
collusion. 30 Tacit collusion alone is not illegal because competition
authorities recognize that placing limitations on a firm’s profitmaximizing behavior and pricing strategy can generate more negative
effects on the market than positive effects. 31 A firm engaging in
rational economic behavior through profit maximization, typically,
increases total and consumer welfare in the market by achieving
economies of scale and decreasing marginal cost, driving innovation,
and better serving consumer needs. 32 Thus, tacit collusion separates
criminal behavior from non-criminal behavior to optimize the
competitive landscape.
29. See Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 3 (“[W]hen markets are
sufficiently transparent and the retaliation lag is sufficiently small, collusion can
always be sustained as an equilibrium strategy, no matter the market structure.”).
But see Price-bots Can Collude Against Consumers, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/05/06/price-bots-cancollude-against-consumers (recognizing that transparent pricing renders any attempt
to steal business by lowering prices self-defeating). The information that firms share
with consumers on open digital platforms, they also share with other firms—
indirectly becoming a part of each other’s pricing and output decision making. E.g.,
Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 20 (explaining
that market manipulation can come in the form of sharing data pools).
30. See Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 5
(noting markets previously unable to engage in tacit collusion now experience
interdependence due to the data availability and the innate nature of electronic
markets); see generally Posner, supra note 18, at 1564-65 (discussing the theory of
oligopolistic interdependence); Maurice Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, Artificial
Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1775, 1800, 1805 (2017) [hereinafter Stucke & Ezrachi, Computers Inhibit
Competition] (explaining that tacit collusion counterweighs overall efficiencies and
creates super competitive prices).
31. See Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 1920 (discussing the inability to condemn a firm for behaving rationally; traditional
tacit collusion is not viewed as market manipulation); McSweeny & O’Dea, supra
note 11, at 77 (profitable price discrimination); see, e.g., Lynch, supra note 23
(explaining that Uber uses surge pricing to reap artificially high profits).
32. See Posner, supra note 18, at 1564 (quoting Professor Donald Turner)
(“[T]he rational oligopolist is behaving in exactly the same way as is the rational
seller in a competitively structured industry; he is simply taking another factor into
account. . . .”).

2019]

NEW THREAT TO COMPETITIVE MARKETS

931

The line between express collusion and tacit collusion blurs when
tacit collusion generates the same negative outcomes as cartels.33
Companies engage in cartels by price fixing, restricting output,
allocating markets, and bid rigging via an agreement. 34 Hard core
cartels are typically regarded as one of the most serious violations of
competition law and found per se illegal by most competition
authorities around the world. 35 Despite the increase in sanctions
against cartelists, they persist and firms continue to collude in a variety
of markets. 36 Presumably, firms agree to engage in cartels because it
is easier than competing. 37 When companies collectively agree to
stabilize their prices at a confident level, then all of the companies can
independently earn greater profits, even with the reduced output due
to lost consumers. 38 These arrangements injure consumers because
increased prices and restricted supply creates a deadweight loss to
society. 39
33. See id. at 1576 (noting the dictionary is no longer acceptable for statutory
interpretation when analyzing concerted activity because of the importance of
context and further arguing that a tacit colluder should be punished the same as an
express colluder when identical outcomes are created—particularly because tacit
collusion is voluntary behavior and thus should be deterred).
34. EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 35.
35. See Recommendation, supra note 4; EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL
COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 35; Stucke & Ezrachi, Computers Inhibit
Competition, supra note 30, at 1777.
36. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 36 (finding
that cartels persist despite rising fines and prisons sentences); see also John M.
Connor & C. Gustav Helmers, Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels
1990-2005 23 (Purdue U., Working Paper No. 06-11, 2006),
https://www.agecon.purdue.edu/working_papers/workingpaper.connor.11.10.06.pd
f (noting 174 documented instances of cartel recidivism in international cartels
studied, of which eighty-six companies recorded three or more cartel violations).
37. EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 35.
38. Posner, supra note 18, at 1568.
39. “When algorithms absorb most or all consumer surplus in a relevant market,
they create an income constraint on consumers, which shifts the demand curve
inward on an indeterminate number of other markets. This, in turn, reduces the sales
opportunities of other producers, and shrinks a range of (ir-relevant) markets, which
is a deadweight loss. From a policy perspective, this rationale could legitimise
antitrust remediation against perfect behavioural discrimination (correcting for
efficiencies), but would leave untouched personal data extraction, given the nonrival and imperfectly appropriable nature of data (no income constraint).” Nicolas
Petit, Antitrust and Artificial Intelligence: A Research Agenda, 8 J. EUR.
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 361, 362 (2017) (recognizing that a deadweight loss
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The existence of an anticompetitive agreement differentiates tacit
collusion from cartels or express collusion. 40 Authorities must identify
the agreement to enforce the law against collusion. 41 The concept of
agreement is broad, but the factors courts and enforcers use to
determine whether one exists historically focus on human behavior. 42
Competing firms use an anticompetitive “agreement” to “govern”
their cartel to maintain a supra-competitive price equilibrium (reduced
output); thus, the firms typically agree on a common policy, a way to
monitor adherence to the common policy, and enforcement against
those who deviate from the common policy. 43 Today, courts
creates an entire group of consumers underserved in the market).
40. Traditional antitrust laws view an agreement as a process of multiple
communications, including negotiations and assurances, not an outcome. ANDREW
I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 379 (3d ed. 2017). An agreement generally
requires the conscious decision to engage in a common scheme or what is judicially
referred to as a “meeting of the minds.” An “agreement” need not be reduced to
writing. Courts may infer the existence of an agreement based on the parties’
behavior. However, something more than mere parallelism is required. Observing
and matching a competitor’s price by itself is not enough. See infra notes 41-46.
41. Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 31-32; see Pricing Algorithms: The
Digital Collusion Scenarios, supra note 22, at 5 (noting the absence of an agreement
leaves authorities with a lack of legal basis for intervention).
42. See McSweeny & O’Dea, supra note 11, at 75 (arguing that concepts such
as “intent” and “meeting of the minds” presuppose human mental states and
decision-making); see also Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 31 (discussing
agreement as a broad term, which in the European Union requires a common will or
some manifestation of a mental state).
43. Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 19. Cartels originated
in smoke-filled rooms, where industrialists would gather to decide on fixed prices.
Accord Lynch, supra note 23 (highlighting the United States’ steel industry pricefixing in 1907 compared to algorithmic price-fixing today); Stucke & Ezrachi,
Computers Inhibit Competition, supra note 30, at 1776 (quoting the United States
Department of Justice) (“We will not tolerate anticompetitive conduct, whether it
occurs in a smoke-filled room or over the Internet using complex pricing algorithms.
American consumers have the right to a free and fair marketplace online, as well as
in brick and mortar businesses.”). Due to technological advancements, agreements
are not as simply formed and less likely to be outright and express. See Salcedo,
supra note 22, at 6 (“Absent the presence of an agreement to change market
dynamics, most competition agencies may lack enforcement tools, outside merger
control, that could effectively deal with the change of market dynamics to facilitate
tacit collusion through algorithms.”); see generally Capobianco et al., supra note 2,
at 33 (citing Severin Borenstein, Rapid Price Communication and Coordination:
The Airline Tariff Publishing Case (1994), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 223
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predominately look for “plus factors” to support an inference of an
agreement from circumstantial evidence. 44 “Plus factors” take many
forms and have acted as the counterweight to requiring direct evidence
of an agreement between all of the firms in the cartel. 45 Enforcement
authorities examine factors tending to distinguish an agreement from
conscious parallelism directly and factors suggesting the industry is
conducive to coordination. 46
Agreements among human cartelists most often self-destruct
because of a lack of trust among competing firms and individuals 47—
the “prisoner’s dilemma” game theory model most accurately portrays
this. 48 Every cartel faces the risk that its members will start cheating
(John E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White eds., 3d ed. 1999)).
44. See Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 4 (noting algorithms could be
considered “plus factors” as an adjustment to current antitrust laws).
45. See, e.g., Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 29-30 (establishing parallel
conduct can infringe competition law alongside “plus factors” which include
communication, information exchanges, signaling, etc.).
46. For cases of proving conspiracy, “plus factors” are synthesized into two
categories. (1) Factors tending to distinguish agreement from conscious parallelism
directly: communication or opportunity to communicate; conduct too complicated
to be explained by mere parallel behavior; and conduct lacking an evident efficiency
explanation. (2) Factors suggesting the industry is conducive to coordination:
industry features; past history of industry coordination; rational motive to behave
collectively; factors suggesting firms are exercising market power; facilitating
factors; and actions contrary to self-interest unless pursued collectively. GAVIL ET
AL., supra note 40, at 370-71.
47. See Posner, supra note 18, at 1570 (cartelists may cheat solely because they
suspect other members are cheating); see also Competition Policy in the Digital Age,
supra note 3, at 37 (noting “[S]ection 1 of the Sherman Act refer[s] to an agreement
including ‘contract’, ‘combination in the form of trust’. . . .”). But see Maurice E.
Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, How Pricing Bots Could Form Cartels and Make Things
More Expensive, HARV. BUS. REV.: BUS. L. (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/10/how-pricing-bots-could-form-cartels-and-make-thingsmore-expensive [hereinafter Stucke & Ezrachi, Pricing Bots] (“Computers do not
exhibit trust. Instead, algorithms engage in cold, profit-maximizing calculations. If
algorithms are less likely than humans to trust one another, maybe they’re less likely
to collude, too.”).
48. “The police are interrogating the suspects about their role in the major crime.
Neither of the prisoners has confessed, but the confession of either would be enough
to convict the other of the major crime. The police want to convict at least one—and
hopefully both—of the prisoners for the major crime, so they offer each the same
deal: ‘If you confess and provide evidence against your partner, then you’ll get no
jail time for either the minor or major crime and he’ll get a three-year sentence.
However, if he confesses and you don’t, you’ll get the three-year sentence and he’ll
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each other as well as the public. 49 The more quickly other members of
the cartel respond to any deviation from the “common plan,” the less
likely an individual firm is to cheat. 50 Notably, digital markets’
characteristics dispel any previous lag time that existed between firm
pricing decisions and the reaction of competitors. 51 The more
transparent the competitive landscape, the easier it becomes for firms
to monitor and understand one another’s actions and interactions with
customers. 52
walk. But, if both of you confess, we won’t need your testimony and both of you
will get a two-year sentence. Finally, if neither of you confesses, then you’ll each
get one year in prison on the minor crime. Your partner is being offered the same
deal.’” Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability,
J. CORP. L. 453, 455 (2006) (noting the suspects are both likely to turn on one
another, due to a lack of trust in the other, and each create the least optimal situation
for himself).
49. Posner, supra note 18, at 1591. Cartelists are more incentivized to cheat the
less likely they are to be detected by competitors—this is due to the profits and
customers to be gained as a result of deviating from the “common plan” set by cartel
members. If everyone else’s prices are set artificially high, then an individual firm
has a lot to gain in short-term customers and profits by undercutting co-cartelists—
also noted by critics of the interdependence theory within oligopolistic markets when
referring to the claim that oligopolies will maintain a supra-competitive price. See
generally id. at 1568 (explaining an oligopolist should not hesitate to undertake price
experiments assuming that he either suspects his deviation will not be detected when
he lowers prices or competitors will engage in price followership when he raises
prices); cf. Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 16 (the payoff to deviation is
nonexistent if it can be instantaneously detected and competitors are able to react).
So, whether a cartel survives becomes dependent on the how quickly other firms in
the cartel can spot these lower prices and retaliate by further undercutting prices. See
Ittoo & Petit, supra note 20, at 1 (without effective detection of cheating, oligopolists
will always have an incentive to cheat).
50. See Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 34 (“Unique to an algorithmic environment is the speed of retaliation.”); McSweeny
& O’Dea, supra note 11, at 75 (pointing to the United States 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines which note that speed in identifying deviation among competitors from
the agreement makes markets more vulnerable to coordination).
51. See Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 29;
Stucke & Ezrachi, Computers Inhibit Competition, supra note 30, at 1805
(regulators could impose a time lag for price increases to better monitor a transparent
market); see also Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 10 (recognizing it becomes less
useful for consumers to engage in price matching when all sellers make their pricing
strategies reliant on one another; thus, transferring consumer power to seller power).
52. See Pricing Algorithms: The Digital Collusion Scenarios, supra note 22, at
5 (addressing the possibility that authorities may attempt to prevent the creation of
excessively transparent markets); e.g., Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 2
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While cartels struggle to maintain trust internally and carry out their
anticompetitive agreement, enforcers of competition law struggle to
detect an “agreement” among the cartelists, especially as cartels
involve more firms. 53 When tacit collusion and express collusion
generate the same outcome, the difficulty in identifying cartelists
versus conscious parallelism becomes incredibly difficult. 54 Further,
large international cartelists impose different distortions on different
nations, adversely impacting markets within particular countries at a
greater or lesser level, making it difficult for some nations to detect an
existing cartel or to understand the magnitude of the distortions the
cartel is creating. 55 OECD member nations’ adoption of enforcement
tools under current competition law becomes essential in detecting
hard core cartels. 56 Looking to the challenges of future cartel
enforcement, “the risk that automated systems could lead to more
effective cartels” presents one of the biggest obstacles for authorities. 57
(noting the increased transparency in financial markets has led to market
distortions).
53. See Cartels and Anti-Competitive Agreements, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/
daf/competition/cartels/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2018); see generally Org. for Econ.
Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], Prosecuting Cartels Without Direct Evidence of
Agreement, at 9, DAF/COMP/GF(2006)7 (Sept. 11, 2006) (often there is no direct
evidence available of an agreement).
54. See Stucke & Ezrachi, Pricing Bots, supra note 47 (noting that collusion
scenarios that result in anticompetitive outcomes necessitate a second look at
enforcement strategies); Posner, supra note 18, at 1562 (arguing that both tacit and
express collusion fall under section one of the Sherman Act). But see Capobianco et
al., supra note 2, at 29 (“Competition rules do not forbid collusive outcomes but
only the means to achieve collusion.”).
55. See Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], Hard Core Cartels: Third
Report on the Implementation on the 1998 Council Recommendation, at 12 (2005),
https://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/35863307.pdf [hereinafter Third Report]
(“International cartels are especially difficult to detect as they use the most
sophisticated measures to conceal their activities, the amount of commerce affected
by these cartels is disproportionately large, and widely considered the most harmful
type of cartel because of the magnitude of the harm that they inflict on businesses
and consumers.”).
56. See Stucke & Ezrachi, Computers Inhibit Competition, supra note 30, at
1795 (recognizing a restricted range of enforcement tools without an “agreement”);
see also Geradin, supra note 23, at 6 (conceding current competition rules and tools
are sufficiently flexible to detect and enforce against anticompetitive behavior).
57. See Margrethe Vestager, European Comm’r for Competition, Remarks at
Bundeskartellamt 18th Conference on Competition: Algorithms and Competition, at
5 (Mar. 16, 2017), (transcript available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
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B. ALGORITHMIC COLLUSION
The fear of automated cartels is unfortunately no longer science
fiction. 58 The use of algorithms, particularly AI, 59 intensifies the risk
of cartels in oligopolistic markets. 60 “Deep-learning” algorithms, a
subfield of AI, enable computer systems to create an artificial neural
network and thus replicate the activity of human neurons. 61 Deeplearning enables computers to learn faster and more accurately than
any other form of machine learning and has the ability to solve
incredibly complex problems. 62 Regardless of the result the machine
produces, programmers cannot understand the decision-making
process behind it. 63
To be sure, algorithms create market efficiencies that human beings
cannot achieve. 64 For supply side efficiencies, algorithms enable
commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/bundeskartellamt-18thconference-competition-berlin-16-march-2017_en) (stating automated systems
deter deviation among cartelists, making cartels more sustainable).
58. See id. at 6 (noting both the United States and United Kingdom have taken
on investigations against the use of automated systems to price fix); Competition
Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 7 (noting the importance of algorithms in
firms today cannot be understated); Kevin W. Christensen, The Next Frontier of
ANTITRUSTSOURCE
(2017),
http://app.antitrustsource.com/
Antitrust?,
antitrustsource/october_2017/MobilePagedReplica.action?pm=1&folio=B-1#pg18
(reviewing ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE
PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY (2016)) (explaining
that industry wide usage of pricing algorithms has contributed to increased market
transparency and frequency of interaction). But see Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra
note 12, at 5 (recognizing most algorithms still operate today on the instructions of
human beings).
59. Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 9 (“Artificial
intelligence refers to the broad branch of computer science that studies and designs
intelligent agents, who should be able to carry out tasks of significant difficulty in a
way that is perceived as ‘intelligent’ (Swarup, 2012).”).
60. See discussion infra Part II(B). The evolution of pattern and recognition
theory developed AI into a more effective tool for scientists and mathematicians
through the development of algorithms that teach machines how to learn,
establishing a new branch of machine learning. Competition Policy in the Digital
Age, supra note 3, at 9.
61. Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 11.
62. See id. (noting deep-learning algorithms are structured in a hierarchy of
increasing complexity and abstraction, different from the traditional linear
algorithms typically employed by firms).
63. See id.
64. See Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 24
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companies to optimize their commercial strategies instantaneously,
particularly in planning, trade, and logistical operations. 65 Further,
they allow firms to optimize outputs and reach near perfect price
discrimination which allows companies to supply services at lower
prices to consumers who were previously underserved, generating
market efficiencies. 66 For demand side efficiencies, algorithms create
“algorithmic consumers” 67 who use the data-driven economy to their
advantage in making purchase decisions—comparing prices and
quality, reducing search costs, overcoming biases and making more
rational decisions, and an overall strengthening of buyer power. 68
Nonetheless, algorithms have the potential to be a powerful tool for
anticompetitive behaviors even with all the efficiencies they create.69
The focal point for competition authorities in regulating algorithmic
(noting algorithms have evolved beyond human decision making); Lynch, supra
note 23 (explaining that automation makes pricing strategies possible that are
unachievable by humans).
65. See generally Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 15-16
(discussing various supply-side efficiencies through pricing algorithms and dynamic
pricing); see also Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 10-11 (noting a positive impact
on static and dynamic efficiency).
66. Perfect price discrimination, also referred to as first-degree price
discrimination, allows sellers to capture all consumer surplus in a market by pricing
their products and services at the exact price that each individual buyer values it. It
is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. McSweeny & O’Dea, supra note
11, at 76-77. Perfect price discrimination means no consumer would be paying more
or less for products and services than the point at which they value them. See
Christensen, supra note 58, at 5 (recognizing self-learning computer algorithms
bring markets closer to perfect price discrimination); Geradin, supra note 23, at 4
(arguing the same factors that allow algorithmic pricing also can enable sellers to
engage in first degree price discrimination).
67. A shift in the decision-making process from sellers to consumers in datadriven markets allows buyers to outsource purchasing decisions to algorithms and
reduce search costs. Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 17.
68. See generally id. (discussing demand side efficiencies); EZRACHI & STUCKE,
VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 3-10 (discussing the promise of a better
competitive environment in the digital age); Geradin, supra note 23, at 2 (explaining
buyers can utilize technology to undermine anticompetitive market outcomes).
69. See Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 18 (stating
developments of new technological tools impact the way market players interact and
communicate, creating risk that some will achieve enhanced market power to further
their private interests); Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra
note 5, at 22 (recognizing automated trading can lead to increased efficiencies as
well as market manipulation).
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collusion should center on understanding the potential they have to
create an extreme form of tacit collusion that could surpass market
distortions traditional hard core cartels create, not on whether
algorithms should be banned or restricted. 70 The international
community needs to collectively address the risks created through the
use of AI pricing algorithms and identify solutions to combat negative
outcomes, as algorithms make it easier than ever for cartels to operate
effectively across borders without detection. 71
Competition law enforcers’ concerns center on two characteristics
of AI deep-learning algorithms as they become tomorrow’s
cartelists. 72 First, a programmed computer can achieve a God-like
view of the marketplace by processing data beyond any human
capacity. 73 These computers can also create joint efforts in data
extraction and sharing, demonstrating speed and efficiency in
communication that would be deemed impossible if left solely to
humans. 74 Second, a concern exists with respect to the increasing
sophistication of algorithms, as they engage in autonomous decision70. See Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 18-19.
71. See Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 3 (serving as an effective
mechanism to coordinate a tacit agreement); McSweeny & O’Dea, supra note 11, at
76 (proposing algorithmic tacit collusion may lead to near-monopolistic pricing).
72. See Vestager, supra note 57, at 3 (discussing the recent approaches taken by
competition authorities to learn more about algorithmic pricing); see also
Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 1 (emphasizing that the OECD roundtable
discussions in 2017 was one of the first times antitrust practitioners came together
to discuss the threats algorithms pose to competitive markets). AI comes with two
particularly concerning technological advancements that are likely to amplify, if not
surpass, the outcome of ordinary tacit collusion, amounting to the market distortions
caused by traditional cartels. See generally EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL
COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 56-60 (referring to algorithmic collusion scenarios
as “tacit collusion on steroids”).
73. EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 71. Big data
typically refers to the ability to collect and analyze a large volume of data which
contains a variety of information in a timely manner, measured in value by velocity,
volume, and variety. Id. at 15. This definition adds a dynamic component to markets
that are unmistakably dynamic in their nature. Xavier Boutin & Georg Clemens,
Defining “Big Data” in Antitrust, COMPETITION POLICY INT’L 3 (2017),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/CPIBoutin-Clemens.pdf.
74. See Christensen, supra note 58, at 6-7; Petit, supra note 39, at 362; see also
Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 20 (suggesting
condemning manipulative actions taken through the sharing of data pools).
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making and have the ability to self-learn. 75 Computers can easily
anticipate and understand each other’s moves, responding to one
another with no lapse in real time. 76
The rapid reactions by algorithmic pricing means sellers can
coordinate price rises more quickly and efficiently than humans could
ever aspire to. 77 Further, price-bots can execute multiple rounds of
price changes and test any relevant market without any one supplier
being at risk of losing customers, resulting in companies having the
ability to “set” higher prices in moments rather than weeks. 78 The
advanced capabilities of AI-enhanced price-bots creates a plausible
scenario where their programmed algorithms hatch a method of
colluding that even their programmers are not able to understand, let
alone be held responsible for. 79 European Commissioner for
Competition Margrethe Vestager alluded to this concern in a recent
speech: “What businesses can and must do is to ensure antitrust
compliance by design. That means pricing algorithms need to be built
in a way that doesn’t allow them to collude.” 80
AI deep-learning algorithms have the potential to create more
durable cartels, outside of oligopolistic markets, at consumers’
75. EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 71. Artificial
intelligence communicating and colluding through their own self-learning processes
and without any intervention by humans, except their creation, is an incredibly
sophisticated scenario that competition authorities have not yet witnessed. See
generally Christensen, supra note 58, at 3, 5; Stucke & Ezrachi, Computers Inhibit
Competition, supra note 30, at 1795.
76. See, e.g., Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5,
at 8 (discussing increased prices in the petroleum industry as a result of increased
market transparency and the ability of firms to respond almost instantaneously to
competitors’ price changes).
77. See Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 24 (diagramming the risks of
algorithmic collusion, including the governing collusive structure that replaces
explicit communication); Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures,
supra note 5, at 26 (discussing a recent experiment set to identify the dominant
strategy of AI in joint profit maximization).
78. Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 9; see
Price-bots Can Collude Against Consumers, supra note 29.
79. See Price-bots Can Collude Against Consumers, supra note 29.
80. See Pricing Algorithms: The Digital Collusion Scenarios, supra note 22, at
3 (quoting Commissioner Vestager) (“What businesses need to know is that when
they decide to use an automated system, they will be held responsible for what it
does. So, they had better know how that system works.”).
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expense and in defiance of traditional enforcement regimes that lack
the capabilities of detection. 81 The use of basic price fixing algorithms,
not AI, already suggests that algorithms make collusion more
sustainable in a wider range of circumstances than before, possibly
even in markets that were in the past characterized by fierce
competition. 82 The oligopoly problem will thus encompass a larger
group of firms than previously anticipated by economists. 83 This
reality exists due to incredibly fast processing and intelligent machines
acting as the decision-makers within markets, not humans. 84
Due to AI pricing algorithms’ “increased accuracy in detecting
changes in price, greater speed in pricing response, and reduced
irrationality in discount rates[,]” they will likely surpass humans in
their ability to achieve and sustain elevated prices through coordinated
interaction and result in robo-sellers more skillful than human
oligopolists in gaining competitive intelligence. 85 Also, uncertainty
and misperception diminishes greatly—two factors which are
81. See Lynch, supra note 23; see also Stucke & Ezrachi, Computers Inhibit
Competition, supra note 30, at 1802 (bypassing regulation and enforcement
safeguards which typically deter price fixing or collusion).
82. See Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 3 (emphasizing algorithms
could collude in markets that were previously characterized by fierce competition);
see generally Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Topkins, No. CR 15-00201
WHO (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2015) (applying pricing algorithms to fix online poster
prices; the poster market in the past was not susceptible to collusion because it is not
an oligopolistic market and offers heterogeneous products).
83. See Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing the ability of
algorithms to collude in a wider spectrum of market structures—beyond
concentrated markets of homogenous products); Competition Policy in the Digital
Age, supra note 3, at 21-23 (expanding the oligopoly problem to non-oligopolistic
market structures).
84. See McSweeny & O’Dea, supra note 11, at 75 (recognizing that under
current law it will be difficult to challenge conduct where the role of humans is
unclear); Stucke & Ezrachi, Computers Inhibit Competition, supra note 30, at 1779
(explaining algorithms are able to autonomously make decisions). “We’re talking
about a velocity of decision-making that isn’t really human,” says Terrell
McSweeny, a commissioner with the United States Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). “All of the economic models are based on human incentives and what we
think humans rationally will do. It’s entirely possible that not all of that learning is
necessarily applicable in some of these markets.” Lynch, supra note 23; see Ezrachi
& Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 4-5.
85. See McSweeny & O’Dea, supra note 11, at 76 (quoting Professor Salil
Mehra).
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commonly relied upon to suppress cartels. 86 Human emotions—fear,
greed, and distrust—do not inhibit machines, reducing the effects of
the prisoner’s dilemma dramatically and giving AI cartels the ability
to persist indefinitely. 87
Because of algorithmic software’s inherent nature, the algorithmic
cartel organization has the potential to distort markets by raising
pricing and restricting supply in economies throughout the world, with
no inhibiting borders. 88 Additionally, AI deep-learning algorithms’
decision-making process cannot be tracked. 89 Thus, it becomes
incredibly difficult to satisfy the agreement requirement of express
collusion—disguising algorithmic cartels as firms’ rational economic
behavior. 90 The global effects of AI algorithmic cartels highlight the
OECD’s role to draft recommendations for member nations to
properly approach international cooperation and comity. 91

C. THE OECD RECOMMENDATION
Two decades ago, the OECD developed and implemented its
Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against
86. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 77;
Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 9.
87. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 77
(recognizing unlike their human counterparts, computers do not fear incarceration;
do not respond in anger; rely on deliberative analysis and not intuition; and minimize
biases such as loss aversion, the sunk costs fallacy, and framing effects); Ezrachi &
Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 4 (emphasizing computer
algorithms are unlikely to exhibit human biases, although it may be reflected in
programming code).
88. See Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], Big Data: Bringing
Competition Policy to the Digital Era, at 17, DAF/COMP(2016)14 (Oct. 27, 2016),
www.oecd.org/daf/competition/big-data-bringing-competition-policy-to-thedigital-era.htm [hereinafter Big Data] (noting firms’ big data strategies lead to crossborder transactions and implications for competition authorities).
89. Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 11.
90. See id. (explaining deep-learning algorithms do not provide any information
about the decision making process of their results); see also Capobianco et al., supra
note 2, at 32, 34 (discussing the meaning of “agreement” produces uncertainty in
cases of algorithmic communication).
91. The evolution of markets towards global digitalization has already triggered
a domino effect in firms’ deployment of algorithms and many of these firms operate
beyond national borders. See Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at
12, 46, 49 (suggesting the creation of a global digital regulator to address the risks
associated with algorithms and AI).
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Hard Core Cartels. 92 The OECD Recommendation’s purpose centers
on regulation of express collusive behavior that results in distorted
international markets and world trade, which further creates market
power, waste, and inefficiency in countries whose markets would
otherwise be competitive. 93 The OECD Recommendation laid the
foundation for all nations to take a second look at their enforcement
procedures against hard core cartels and created a ripple effect in
which many nations adjusted their approach. 94 The Recommendation
also pushed nations towards creating international cooperation
agreements to share information during investigations and more
effectively target hard core cartels. 95 International comity lies at the
core of the agreement as the OECD recognizes the egregious harm
caused by hard core cartels rarely takes place inside one nation or
economic region. 96
Two primary concerns divide the OECD Recommendation—each
encompassed under the overarching idea of achieving the most
effective enforcement approach to hard core cartels. 97 The first Part
calls for effective sanctions to deter participation in hard core cartels,
as well as designating institutions with adequate enforcement power
to detect and remedy hard core cartels, including powers to force
92. See generally Recommendation, supra note 4 (outlining international
cooperation and comity in enforcing laws prohibiting hard core cartels).
93. Estimates in the United States suggest that some hardcore cartels can result
in price increases of up to sixty to seventy percent, while other nations note that the
pricing matches that of a monopolized market. Third Report, supra note 55, at 25.
OECD made its Recommendation considering that hard core cartels are the most
egregious violators of competition law and that they injure consumers in many
countries by raising prices and restricting supply, thus making goods and services
completely unavailable to some purchasers and unnecessarily expensive for others.
Recommendation, supra note 4.
94. See Third Report, supra note 55, at 3 (reporting the progress of member and
observer countries in their cartel enforcement within seven years of the
implementation of the Recommendation).
95. See Recommendation, supra note 4 (encouraging national legislation and
bilateral or multilateral agreements to effectively achieve common interests in
deterring cartels).
96. See id. (noting enforcement activities should be in accordance with comity
principles when they affect other countries’ interests).
97. See id. (advising Adherents to ensure that their competition laws effectively
halt and deter hard core cartels by providing for effective sanctions and adequate
enforcement procedures and institutions to detect and remedy hard core cartels).
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compliance on firms. 98 This Part includes the OECD’s definition of a
“hard core cartel” and what the term does and does not encompass. 99
A “hard core cartel” is defined as “an anticompetitive agreement,
anticompetitive concerted practice, or anticompetitive arrangement by
competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids (collusive tenders),
establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or divide markets by
allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or lines of commerce.” 100
The second Part of the OECD Recommendation calls for
international cooperation and comity in enforcing laws prohibiting
hard core cartels. 101
1. Member countries have a common interest in preventing hard core cartels
and should co-operate with each other in enforcing their laws against such
cartels. In this connection, they should seek ways in which co-operation
might be improved by positive comity principles applicable to requests that
another country remedy anticompetitive conduct that adversely affects both
countries, and should conduct their own enforcement activities in
accordance with principles of comity when they affect other countries’
important interests. 2. Co-operation between or among Member countries
in dealing with hard core cartels should take into account the following

98. “Member countries should ensure that their competition laws effectively halt
and deter hard core cartels. In particular, their laws should provide for: a) Effective
sanctions, of a kind and at a level adequate to deter firms and individuals from
participating in such cartels; and b) Enforcement procedures and institutions with
powers adequate to detect and remedy hard core cartels, including powers to obtain
documents and information and to impose penalties for non-compliance.” Id.
(“Convergence and Effectiveness of Laws Prohibiting Hard Core Cartels”).
99. “The hard core cartel category does not include agreements, concerted
practices, or arrangements that (i) are reasonably related to the lawful realization of
cost-reducing or output-enhancing efficiencies, (ii) are excluded directly or
indirectly from the coverage of a Member country’s own laws, or (iii) are authorized
in accordance with those laws. However, all exclusions and authorizations of what
would otherwise be hard core cartels should be transparent and should be reviewed
periodically to assess whether they are both necessary and no broader than necessary
to achieve their overriding policy objectives. After the issuance of this
Recommendation, Members should provide the Organization annual notice of any
new or extended exclusion or category of authorization.” Id.
100. Id.
101. “In order to establish a framework for their co-operation in dealing with hard
core cartels, Member countries are encouraged to consider entering into bilateral or
multilateral agreements or other instruments consistent with these principles.” Id.
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principles. . . . 102

The OECD does not explicitly call for member nations to adopt or
change their laws because the OECD does not operate as an
enforcement body, but instead operates as a forum for governments to
seek solutions to common problems. 103 Additionally, it emphasizes
that a hindrance to cooperation may result from inconsistencies among
countries’ approaches to the same problem. 104 These inconsistencies
could explain why the OECD calls for member countries to enter into
bilateral or multilateral agreements, urging a close in the gap of hard
core cartel enforcement. 105
Despite the gaps in competition law in the international community,
this Recommendation undoubtedly has been a factor in driving
international comity and cooperation in the enforcement against hard
core cartels. 106 The OECD’s most recent report on the implementation
102. “The common interest in preventing hard core cartels generally warrants cooperation to the extent that such co-operation would be consistent with a requested
country’s laws, regulations, and important interests; To the extent consistent with
their own laws, regulations, and important interests, and subject to effective
safeguards to protect commercially sensitive and other confidential information,
Member countries’ mutual interest in preventing hard core cartels warrants cooperation that might include sharing documents and information in their possession
with foreign competition authorities and gathering documents and information on
behalf of foreign competition authorities on a voluntary basis and when necessary
through use of compulsory process; A Member country may decline to comply with
a request for assistance, or limit or condition its co-operation on the ground that it
considers compliance with the request to be not in accordance with its laws or
regulations or to be inconsistent with its important interests or on any other grounds,
including its competition authority’s resource constraints or the absence of a mutual
interest in the investigation or proceeding in question; Member countries should
agree to engage in consultations over issues relating to co-operation.” Id.
103. About the OECD, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 20,
2019); see also Recommendation, supra note 4 (recommending nations maintain
effective safeguards but recognize that this will be achieved to the extent it is
consistent with their own laws).
104. See Recommendation, supra note 4 (recognizing a country may decline to
engage in cooperation due to inconsistencies in national laws and interests).
105. See id. (“Member countries are encouraged to review all obstacles to their
effective co-operation in the enforcement of laws against hard core cartels and to
consider actions, including national legislation and/or bilateral or multilateral
agreements or other instruments, by which they could eliminate or reduce those
obstacles in a manner consistent with their important interests.”).
106. See Third Report, supra note 55, at 9 (noting the significant progress towards
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of the Recommendation, published in 2005, notes progress for sixteen
economic areas in their sanctioning and deterrence of cartelists. 107 The
report praises the increase in international agreements, particularly in
enforcement cooperation and the implementation of effective
sanctions and attractive leniency programs. 108
In 2004, the United States, alongside its enforcement body, the
Department of Justice (DOJ), reformed its Antitrust Criminal Penalty
Enforcement and Reform Act to increase maximum corporate fines
from $10 million to $100 million; maximum individual fines from
$350 thousand to $1 million; and maximum jail time from three years
to ten years. 109 The European Union established the European
Competition Network, 110 which strengthened the investigative powers
of the European Commission (EC), 111 and adopted a new leniency
policy. 112 Most recently, the EC has implemented the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), addressing challenges to competition
law authorities that endanger consumer protection as a result of data
sharing. 113 Brazil, one of the original signatories to the
Recommendation despite its status as an OECD non-member, created
winning the support of lawmakers to strengthen enforcement tools; at the time of the
implementation of the agreement, most competition authorities did not have the
authority to share investigatory information with foreign competition authorities).
107. Id. at 9-11.
108. Id. at 8.
109. “The Act also strengthened the DOJ Antitrust Division’s Amnesty Program
by limiting a corporate amnesty applicant’s private damages exposure to the
damages actually inflicted by the applicant’s conduct, provided the applicant
cooperates with private plaintiffs in their damage actions against remaining cartel
members.” Id. at 11.
(2015),
110. European
Competition
Network
(ECN),
OECD
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-inventory-europeancompetition-network.pdf.
111. “The investigation powers of the European Commission were strengthened
by introducing the rights to seal any business premises and books or records, inspect
other than business premises (for instance private homes), interview any person who
may be in possession of useful information and record the answers, as well as by
extending the right to ask oral questions during an inspection to a right to question
any member of staff.” Third Report, supra note 55, at 12.
112. The ECN’s new leniency policy adopted the practice of taking oral
statements in leniency applications. Id.
113. Aysem Vanberg & Mehmet Ünver, The Right to Data Portability in the
GDPR and EU Competition Law: Odd Couple or Dynamic Duo? 8 EUR. J.L. TECH.
1, 6 (2017).
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an intelligence center for cartel investigations within one of its
antitrust agencies, which works closely alongside prosecutors and
federal police to use new investigatory techniques, namely dawn raids
and wiretapping. 114
India, Russia, and China, albeit not original parties to the
Recommendation, have followed suit and upended their previous
approaches to regulating competition and implemented new
enforcement procedures within the past two decades. 115 The
Competition Commission of India (CCI) was created in 2003, and its
Competition Act was modified in 2007 to prohibit anti-competitive
agreements and the abuse of dominant positions by enterprises.116
Russia established the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) in 2004,
which gave the agency control over public procurement, foreign
investments and advertising law compliance, and observation of
competition rules by the public authorities. 117 Most recently, FAS
fined $179 million RUB ($2,840,923 USD) to a group of computer
suppliers found guilty of collusion. 118 In 2007, China promulgated the
Anti-Monopoly Law, 119 the legal framework for the prohibition of
cartels, enforced by the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) and the State Administration for Industry and
Commerce (SAIC). 120 In 2017, the NDRC and the SAIC exercised
their respective investigative authority to end six national cartels and
impose over $73 million USD in fines. 121
114. Third Report, supra note 55, at 9.
115. See sources cited infra notes 116-121.
116. About CCI, COMPETITION COMM’N OF INDIA, https://www.cci.gov.in/aboutcci (last visited Jan. 20, 2019); Competition Act, COMPETITION COMM’N OF INDIA,
https://www.cci.gov.in/competition-act (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
117. Igor Artemiev, What We Do, FED. ANTIMONOPOLY SERV. OF THE RUSS.
FED’N, http://en.fas.gov.ru/about/what-we-do/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
118. Press Release, Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation,
Fines to Computer Suppliers Guilty of Collusion (June 22, 2018),
https://en.fas.gov.ru/press-center/news/detail.html?id=53103.
119. Overview of the Law and Enforcement Regime Relating to Cartels, GLOBAL
LEGAL INSIGHTS, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/cartels-lawsand-regulations/china#chaptercontent1 (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
120. See id. (explaining the NDRC governs enforcement against anti-price
monopolies while the SAIC handles all prohibition on monopoly agreements, abuse
of market power, and the abuse of intellectual property rights).
121. Overview of Cartel Enforcement Activity During the Last 12 Months,
GLOBAL LEGAL INSIGHTS, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/
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Within the two decades following the implementation of the
Recommendation, the United States entered into bilateral cooperation
agreements with Russia (2009), 122 Brazil (1999), 123 India (2012), 124
China (2011), 125 and the European Union (1998), 126 all of which center
on cooperating in investigations to preserve competitive markets. This
paper focuses on these economic areas. 127
cartels-laws-and-regulations/china#chaptercontent3 (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
122. See generally Memorandum of Understanding on Antitrust Cooperation
Between the United States Department of Justice and the United States Federal
Trade Commission, on the One Hand, and the Russian Federal Anti-Monopoly
Service, on the Other Hand, U.S.-Russ., Nov. 10, 2009, https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2009/11/12/251836.pdf.
123. See generally Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding
Cooperation Between Their Competition Authorities in the Enforcement of their
Competition Laws, U.S.-Braz., Oct. 26, 1999, https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/08/10/3776.pdf.
124. See generally Memorandum of Understanding on Antitrust Cooperation
Between the United States Department of Justice and the United States Federal
Trade Commission, and the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (Government of India)
and the Competition Commission of India, U.S.-India, Sept. 27, 2012,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2012/10/24/287457a.pdf.
125. See generally Guidance for Case Cooperation Between the Ministry of
Commerce and the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission on
Concentration of Undertakings (Merger) Cases, U.S.-China, Nov. 29, 2011,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2011/11/29/277772.pdf.
126. See generally Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the European Communities on the Application of Positive Comity
Principles in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, U.S.-Eur. Communities,
June 4, 1998, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/
1781.pdf.
127. The methodology for choosing these economic regions included taking the
world’s ten largest economies, based solely on nominal GDP, and cross-checking
that list with the regions that have the highest estimated global growth in real GDP
through 2019. See generally Rob Smith, The World’s Biggest Economies in 2018,
WORLD ECON. FORUM (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/
the-worlds-biggest-economies-in-2018/. Cartels distort the distribution of welfare in
an economy and the flow of goods in world trade, so I wanted to zero in on the
countries that are most likely to be affected. At this point, the listed economies were:
China, the United States, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Russia.
Japan and the United Kingdom did make the cut because they are falling and
expected to continue to fall in their economic growth and global worth—they are
projected to be replaced by Indonesia at fourth, Brazil at fifth, and Russia at sixth in
the world’s largest economies. These economic areas were then cross-checked with
the United States’ largest trading partners and the nations that have identified
algorithmic collusion as a problem in the context of OECD discussions. This cross-
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The OECD most recently reports that “international cooperation in
discovering, investigating, and prosecuting international cartels has
reached unprecedented levels.” 128 The need for international comity
and greater cooperation will grow as cartels become more automated
and difficult to detect. 129 The OECD recognizes that the Competition
Committee’s “next steps” include continuing to promote “enhanced
opportunities for competition authorities to exchange information in
cartel investigations.” 130

III.

ANALYSIS

This Section argues that the OECD’s Recommendation
encompasses algorithmic collusion and that member nations’ antitrust
and competition enforcement authorities must recognize the ability of
computers to form hard core cartels. Part A addresses the threat to the
global economy that algorithmic collusion poses. 131 Part B focuses on
the Recommendation’s insufficiency in promoting international
enforcement cooperation in cases of robotic cartels. 132 Part B identifies
the potential gaps in algorithmic collusion enforcement and the overall
effects of the global antitrust community taking divergent
approaches. 133 Section B concludes by explaining the OECD’s present
inability to fulfill its role of facilitating international comity.

checking process took Indonesia off the list. Although Russia, China, India, and
Brazil are not OECD member nations, they are highly engaged with OECD
roundtable discussions and vital to the global economy.
128. Third Report, supra note 55, at 30.
129. See id. (noting mutual legal assistance agreements have played an important
role in international cartel cases to obtain evidence in foreign jurisdictions); see also
Vestager, supra note 57, at 6 (recognizing competition enforcers need to be prepared
to deal with the challenges of algorithmic collusion enforcement, pointing towards
recent cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom).
130. Third Report, supra note 55, at 41.
131. See discussion infra Part III(A).
132. See discussion infra Part III(B) (identifying that this is due to the lack of
detection cooperation, the absence of identifying liable behaviors and individuals,
and the resulting trickle-down effects on enforcement cooperation).
133. See discussion infra Part III(B)(3).
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A. THE OECD’S RECOMMENDATION CAPTURES THE COLLUSIVE
BEHAVIOR AND AMPLIFIED OUTCOMES CREATED BY ALGORITHMIC
COLLUSION.

The core of the Recommendation calls for international comity and
enforcement cooperation in regulating hard core cartels. 134 Although
the Recommendation evidently frames hard core cartels in the
traditional context of their 20th century existence, its overall purpose
is to deter and prohibit the anti-competitive behaviors of cartels. 135 As
technology’s presence, scalability, and capabilities advance, so does
the sophistication of hard core cartels—from making agreements in a
smoke-filled room to collaboration over the phone. 136 These
technological advancements now encompass AI deep-learning
algorithms, and the OECD’s Recommendation must capture these
advancements and their amplified anticompetitive outcomes. 137
The damage hard core cartels inflict on international consumer
welfare and world trade does not discriminate against digital markets,
and neither should competition authorities. 138 What becomes essential
for the OECD’s member nations to formally address is the ability of
134. See Recommendation, supra note 4 (considering that hard core cartels are
particularly important from an international perspective because of their distortion
of world trade while operating in secret, and relevant evidence is located in foreign
jurisdictions).
135. See id. (“Effective sanctions, of a kind and at a level adequate to deter firms
and individuals from participating in such cartels. . . .”).
136. See Salcedo, supra note 22, at 2 (“Optimal pricing algorithms can be highly
profitable, as they would be sophisticated enough to recognize and take advantage
of profitable collusion opportunities.”); SHEARMAN & STERLING, KEY ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT TRENDS: 2018 ANTITRUST ANNUAL REPORT 44 (2018),
https://www.shearman.com/perspectives/2018/04/2018-antitrust-report/artificialintelligence-and-algorithms-in-cartel-cases (noting the use of a more sophisticated
tool to monitor the implementation of an agreement).
137. See Third Report, supra note 55, at 15 (recognizing that cartel participants
devise sophisticated regimes to operate their cartels). But see Capobianco et al.,
supra note 2, at 29 (highlighting that competition rules do not forbid collusive
outcomes, but only collusive behavior—AI could be considered collusive behavior
under current regulation if viewed as a “plus factor”).
138. See Lynch, supra note 23 (emphasizing the central assumption that the
digital economy lowers prices and expands choices would be upended by increasing
ease to engage in anticompetitive behaviors; Vestager, supra note 57, at 8 (stating
the digital age has led to the European Union creating new rules on data protection
to ensure protection by design).
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technology to transform traditional cartels into nearly any form they
see fit to most effectively escape regulators, which includes masking
a hard core cartel as what is recognized to be another form of tacit
collusion. 139 Further, AI’s capabilities develop more sustainable and
destructive cartels than distrusting individuals. 140 The OECD and its
member nations have recognized this potential level of harm, making
it even more inconceivable that the OECD excludes algorithmic
cartels from its Recommendation. 141
The responsive behavior of deep-learning algorithms equates to that
of an anticompetitive agreement, which the Recommendation directly
addresses under the definition of a hard core cartel. 142 Ultimately,
viewing an anticompetitive “agreement” in antitrust laws as solely
human-centric must be overcome, as it presupposes human mental
states and proves less useful in dealing with computer software. 143 In
essence, rather than a “meeting of the minds,” antitrust enforcers face
a “meeting of the algorithms” in which algorithms’ responses to
activities (e.g., reducing prices) by other members of the algorithmic
cartel are used to track the “acceptance” of an anticompetitive
139. See Salcedo, supra note 22, at 5 (stating findings suggest that pricing
algorithms are seen as an effective tool for tacit collusion, meaning it will likely fall
outside the scope of current regulation); see also Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note
12, at 5 (recognizing the subtly of anti-competitive behaviors enabled by
algorithms).
140. See Pricing Algorithms: The Digital Collusion Scenarios, supra note 22, at
5 (noting market players are now more easily able to sustain a supra-competitive
price equilibrium); see also Stucke & Ezrachi, Computers Inhibit Competition,
supra note 30, at 1778 (discussing the greater risk of sustainable tacit collusion); cf.
Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 2 (arguing that if algorithms are being
used for firms to customize their service and product offerings, then collusion might
be harder to sustain due to low incentives for low-cost firms to engage in collusion).
141. See generally Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 7
(emphasizing “how algorithms can make tacit collusion more likely, both in
oligopolistic markets with high barriers to entry and a high degree of transparency,
and in markets where traditionally tacit collusive outcomes would be difficult to
achieve and sustain over time, widening the scope of the so-called ‘oligopoly
problem’.”).
142. See Recommendation, supra note 4; see also Salcedo, supra note 22, at 4
(explaining that pricing algorithms are responsive to market outcomes); cf. Big Data,
supra note 88, at 10 (recognizing that the responsive behavior of algorithms benefits
both consumers and firms by lowering search costs).
143. See McSweeny & O’Dea, supra note 11, at 75, 79 (noting concepts such as
“intent” and “meeting of the minds” presuppose a human mental state).
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arrangement. 144 Markets comprised of sufficiently homogenous
products easily demonstrate this—firms can simply program pricing
algorithms to follow a market leader by imitating in real time any price
deviations. 145 Yet, if the leader realizes what is happening without
communicating with the remaining companies, this will likely result
in a collusive outcome that, today, would hardly amount to an antitrust
violation in any jurisdiction in the world. 146
Image A: Meeting of the Algorithms 147
Offer
(1) Firm intermittently sets a higher price
for brief seconds (costless signal)
(2) Firm programs algorithm to mimic the
price of a leader
(3) Firm publicly releases a pricing
algorithm
(4) Firm programs an anti-competitive
price to be triggered whenever the
competitor’s price is below a threshold
(5) Firm uses ML algorithm to maximize
joint profits (for instance, by accounting
for the spillover on competitors’
profits)

Acceptance
Competitor increases price to the value
signaled
The leader, recognizing this behavior,
increases the prices
Competitor downloads and executes the
same pricing algorithm
Recognizing the algorithm, the competitor
always keeps the price above the threshold
Competitor reacts with the same strategy

144. See infra Image A: Meeting of the Algorithms; e.g., Capobianco & Gonzaga,
supra note 12, at 4 (“[I]f firms program prices to replicate the price of a market
leader, this could be seen as an offer to collude, which would be accepted when the
leader raised the price.”). But see Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 34 (questioning
whether a meeting of the algorithms can amount to anticompetitive agreement).
145. Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 3-4; see, e.g., Ezrachi & Stucke,
Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 8-9 (major oil firms that dominate
Perth, Australia’s concentrated retail petrol market used price transparency to
facilitate tacit collusion which “sustainably improved retail margins, created price
stability in the presence of aggregate shocks, and enabled firms to resolve conflict
quickly”).
146. See Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 20
(observing that “pure” forms of tacit collusion result from the rational behaviors by
firms in reaction to market characteristics and do not trigger liability); e.g., Lynch,
supra note 23 (stating German regulators have warned that anticompetitive effects
of sophisticated algorithms (AI) could be difficult to prosecute); see also
Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 5 (explaining AI has become associated
with many risks outside of the scope of antitrust—privacy, information bias, and
discrimination in some cases).
147. Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 34; Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note
12, at 5.
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Global competition authorities cannot let firms hide behind the
Recommendation’s exception for agreements “reasonably related to
the lawful realisation of cost-reducing or output-enhancing
efficiencies.” 148 Firms tend to program AI algorithms for profit
maximization, and that profit maximization, particularly within
oligopolistic markets, is most easily achieved when “competitors” no
longer compete—a realization humans have always had and one that
will not take long for deep-learning algorithms to realize. 149 The
subsequent realizations of reduced costs could be an outcome, but
likely not the target, of profit maximizing algorithms. 150 Further, this
exception was never meant to serve as an “out” for price-fixing firms
significantly harming the competitive landscape, and it should not be
treated as such just because cartels learn to communicate in novel
ways.
It would be inadequate to conclude that the Recommendation,
which recognizes hard core cartels as one of the largest threats to fair
global trade and competition, is not intended to address cartels
attempting to pass as tacit collusion in the form of advanced
technology. Recognizing such cartels as just a modern version of tacit
collusion rather than actual cartels leaves all digital markets, even
those outside the traditional “oligopoly problem,” vulnerable to vast
manipulation and anticompetitive outcomes. 151 AI algorithmic cartels
148. Recommendation, supra note 4.
149. See Stucke & Ezrachi, Computers Inhibit Competition, supra note 30, at
1783 (illustrating profit maximization as “competitors unilaterally create and use
computer algorithms to achieve a given target”); see also Big Data, supra note 88,
at 23 (proposing that machine-learning allows algorithms to achieve tacit collusion
in scenarios where the programmer may not have foreseen such an outcome).
150. See, e.g., EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 7374 (“Amazon, in 2015, was developing a platform for the Internet of Things, where
a ‘whole ecosystem of manufacturers, service providers, and application developers
[can] easily connect their products to the cloud at scale, take action on the data they
collect, and create a new class of applications that interact with the physical
world.’”).
151. See, e.g., Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 25 (“One of
the main risks of algorithms is that they expand the grey area between unlawful
explicit collusion and lawful tacit collusion, allowing firms to sustain profits above
the competitive level more easily without necessarily having to enter into an
agreement.”).
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can respond to other firms’ decisions more accurately with greater
speed and likely maintain the most sustainable cartels the global
antitrust community has ever faced. 152
The market impact of AI cartels requires a sustained commitment
to international comity. The lack of borders in limitlessly reaching
economic regions makes these cartels even more difficult to detect and
monitor than traditional ones. 153 International comity and cooperation
becomes more vital under this scenario than the global antitrust
community has before experienced. 154 Excluding AI algorithmic
collusion from the Recommendation would be a signal to the
international antitrust community that only humans have the ability to
collude and engage in anticompetitive behavior, which competition
authorities no longer recognize as truth. 155 The OECD’s
Recommendation addresses the same type of anticompetitive behavior
that AI is capable of, as well as the challenges to competition
authorities presented by these types of advanced, wide-spread
cartels. 156 Thus, member nations must recognize the Recommendation
152. See Geradin, supra note 23, at 1 (stating retaliation via algorithms will be
much faster, and thus less profitable for firms—making them more sustainable);
Lynch, supra note 23, at 1 (acknowledging that pricing tools are far faster than any
human merchant); McSweeny & O’Dea, supra note 11, at 77 (noting faster analytics
enable companies to sort customers into more targeted groups).
153. See Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 17
(recognizing “algorithms may make price fixing attempts more frequent and more
difficult to detect.”); cf. Posner, supra note 18, at 1590 (conceding that because tacit
collusion is more difficult to detect than express collusion, it should be punished just
as, if not more, severely).
154. See Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 43 (recognizing
that big online companies’ increasing reliance on secret algorithms poses a concern
that the organization of the world’s information today is, to some extent, controlled
by automated systems in the hands of a few market players across all industries).
155. See Pricing Algorithms: The Digital Collusion Scenarios, supra note 22, at
4 (emphasizing that algorithms provide a breeding ground for tacit collusion as
market data becomes more accessible and market transparency increases); see also
Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 27 (discussing how nations individually are
currently conducting market studies and investigations to obtain empirical evidence
of the capabilities of algorithmic collusion).
156. See Recommendation, supra note 4 (defining hard core cartels as those
engaging in an “anticompetitive agreement, anticompetitive concerted practice, or
anticompetitive arrangement by competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids
(collusive tenders), establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or divide markets
by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or lines of commerce. . . .”); Stucke &
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as such and cannot afford to let AI fall on the same side of the line as
tacit collusion and not cartels.

B. THE RECOMMENDATION IS INSUFFICIENT FOR EFFECTIVE AI
ALGORITHMIC CARTEL ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION AMONG
MEMBER AND NON-MEMBER NATIONS.

While the OECD’s Recommendation encompasses AI algorithmic
collusion, it insufficiently advances international comity and
enforcement cooperation in the context of AI algorithmic collusion.157
Based on its Recommendation, the OECD clearly did not anticipate
such rapid improvements in cartel formation, operational efficiencies,
and sustainable execution. 158 Nor did the OECD anticipate that the
division between tacit collusion and express collusion would become
nearly impossible to identify. 159 The world’s largest economies’
divergent approaches to algorithmic cartel enforcement highlight this
problem. 160
1. Lack of Detection Cooperation
The Recommendation lacks focus on the detection of hard core
Ezrachi, Computers Inhibit Competition, supra note 30, at 1784 (explaining that
classic cartel arrangements include fixing prices—here, humans leave it to the
computer algorithms to collude in secrecy and fix prices).
157. See discussion infra Part III(B)(1-3).
158. See Big Data, supra note 88, at 8 (recognizing that big data is a large factor
in operational efficiencies); Vestager, supra note 57, at 8 (warning competition
enforcers to keep an eye out for cartels that use software (algorithms) to operate
more effectively); see generally Recommendation, supra note 4 (lacking any
mention of possible advancements in cartel formation—particularly in the digital
age).
159. Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 25; see EZRACHI &
STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 36-37 (arguing that adoption of
the same pricing technology, and thus identical reactions to changing market
conditions by competitors, creates the same results as if executives had expressly
colluded on prices).
160. The Recommendation makes no mention, outside of the OECD’s definition
of hard core cartels, of what behaviors directly and indirectly trigger liability (i.e.,
facilitating market manipulation). Further, the part of the Recommendation (Part B)
devoted to international comity and cooperation makes no mention of cooperation
in the detection phase—rather the OECD jumps directly to enforcement. See
generally Recommendation, supra note 4 (calling for institutions with the “power”
to detect cartels).

2019]

NEW THREAT TO COMPETITIVE MARKETS

955

cartels. 161 Competition authorities already face challenges in detecting
global cartels created via human decision making; now enforcers are
left with no theory of establishing an anticompetitive intent, no
conversation to record, and no trade association to monitor. 162 Further,
member nations are left with an international recommendation calling
for unification in sanctions and enforcement, but no understanding
among nations on how to detect the most intelligent and sustainable
cartels competition authorities have ever faced. 163
In practice, detection will likely pose more challenges for
authorities than the actual enforcement against the cartel. 164 The
position of competition authorities does not enable them to determine
if any particular pricing outcome naturally results from a working
market or an algorithm. 165 It would likewise be unrealistic for regional
competition authorities to continuously monitor the market behavior
of every algorithm. 166 Further, agencies are unequipped to analyze the
161. See generally id.
162. See Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 11 (noting that
regardless of the results generated, programmers are unable to dissect an algorithm’s
decision-making process); Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures,
supra note 5, at 5 (“Generally, for illegal cartels involving express collusion which
were detected and prosecuted, the empirical research has that cartels involving a
trade association were on average over twice as large than cartels without a trade
association involved.”); Pricing Algorithms: The Digital Collusion Scenarios, supra
note 22, at 3 (averring that programmers may unintentionally omit safeguards to
prevent communication from happening but are unable to track whether the
algorithm has been engaging in communication in deciding if safeguards are
necessary).
163. See Big Data, supra note 88, at 24 (recognizing the lack of clarity for how
antitrust authorities can and will adjust their tools to fight digital cartels); Ezrachi &
Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 34 (recognizing that
current legal challenges create the possibility of various counter-measures for
nations to take in tackling algorithmic collusion); cf. Stucke & Ezrachi, Computers
Inhibit Competition, supra note 30, at 1784 (noting in Table 1, the uncertainty, under
current competition law, of whether the Digital Eye scenario (AI) can satisfy the
requirements of agreement, intent, and liability).
164. See McSweeny & O’Dea, supra note 11, at 76 (averring that detection of AI
cartels will require novel investigatory approaches and likely additional resources);
Stucke & Ezrachi, Pricing Bots, supra note 47 (noting AI can expand tacit collusion
beyond traditional oligopolistic markets and beyond easy detection).
165. Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 23. But
see Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 54 (scholars have
suggested that this problem could be countered by auditing algorithms).
166. Competition authorities taking on the role of auditing and monitoring
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behavior of deep-learning algorithms as they continuously learn based
on their ever-changing environment, which is incredibly difficult to
audit in a uniform fashion. 167
The complete inability to track the “thinking” of the computer and
its decision-making process poses a greater challenge to international
competition authorities, with no “trail” to follow in establishing
anticompetitive intent or behaviors. 168 Rather, these deep-learning
algorithms simply respond to their environment in the most profit
maximizing way. 169 The level of human collaboration in an
algorithmic cartel could be great or nearly nonexistent aside from the
implementation of the algorithm. 170 The OECD frames this as an
enforcement issue, but the implications on detection are just as
great. 171 Borderless cartels creating artificial market pricing without
algorithms creates a significant burden on regulators. This would require the
auditing of a very large volume of algorithms and a high degree of technical
expertise to understand their functions and effects. Further, in the initial stages of
implementation, it will likely be difficult to tell if the algorithm that a firm submits
is the one used in the marketplace. Additionally, in the case of neural networks, it
may be impossible to actually effectively audit a complex system and its affects as
the algorithm continuously learns based on its current environment and purpose of
implementation. See Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 4; Ezrachi & Stucke,
Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 23.
167. See Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 54 (quoting
Ezrachi and Stucke) (recognizing that the high technical expertise and amount of
man-power required to audit deep-learning algorithms is outside the realm of what
a typical government agency is equipped to take on).
168. Id. at 11 (“[R]egardless of the quality of the results produced, deep learning
algorithms do not provide programmers with information about the decision-making
process leading to such results.”).
169. See Big Data, supra note 88, at 23 (emphasizing that programmers do not
necessarily foresee a tacit collusive outcome when utilizing AI solely for profitmaximizing—although it may be the result); Stucke & Ezrachi, Computers Inhibit
Competition, supra note 30, at 1796 (explaining that collusive behavior is triggered
by the AI’s self-learning nature in a transparent market occupied by similar minded
agents that all have the same goal: to maximize profits).
170. See Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 25
(explaining that advanced technologies with the ability to act independently can
completely lack human input post development and implementation); cf. Ittoo &
Petit, supra note 20, at 1 (discussing the lack of clarity on the capabilities of AI to
enter into tacit collusion strategies without any human intervention).
171. The OECD’s only roundtable discussion report on algorithmic collusion
focuses the discussion around enforcement challenges presented to competition
authorities and proper remedies, barely addressing the initial challenge of detection
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the ability to scrounge up the slightest bit of communication between
firms makes detection of these cartels nearly impossible. 172 AI cartels
manipulate global markets while competition authorities attempt to
detect them regionally. 173
Algorithmic cartels test the boundaries of the OECD’s
Recommendation. 174 Where at one point it may have been enough to
have international cooperation solely in enforcement investigations,
this will no longer be the case. The OECD only addresses detection in
the context of giving regional authorities the “power adequate to
detect” and not in the context of international comity and
cooperation. 175 The novel challenges to authorities that come with the
increasing use of algorithms in day-to-day business practices requires
novel approaches to international cooperation. 176 The OECD’s
Recommendation lacks acknowledgement of the importance of
before enforcement can ever take place. See Competition Policy in the Digital Age,
supra note 3, at 3.
172. See Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 3 (averring that agencies can
rely on the existing framework to assess algorithms for infringement of competition
law, but the detection of such infringement will likely be complex); see also Big
Data, supra note 88, at 22 (discussing the lack of literature about the implications of
big data for the detection and investigation of cartels).
173. See Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 10 (stating national governments are
focused on detection, while the international community is focused on enforcement);
e.g., Third Report, supra note 55, at 21 (noting that the United States published a
checklist of suspicious behaviors and statements to assist foreign officials in their
detection methods—but the list was nothing beyond simple advisement) (checklist
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/primer-ncu.htm).
174. The largest challenge to the OECD’s definition will come in the form of
whether computers are able to create an anticompetitive agreement without human
knowledge of said agreement. The consequences of acknowledging an
anticompetitive agreement as reliant on human mental states could include
incredibly sustainable, ever enduring cartels outside of the law’s reach and
enforcement. See Ittoo & Petit, supra note 20, at 2 (“[A]utomated pricing via
algorithmic processing of collected mass data may tend to lead pricing above the
competitive level, either via tacit collusion or more robust cartel formation. . . .”).
But see Stucke & Ezrachi, Pricing Bots, supra note 47 (noting algorithmic collusion
as it is studied and known today does not amount to a hard core cartel, but rather
extreme tacit collusion outside of the law’s reach).
175. Recommendation, supra note 4.
176. McSweeny & O’Dea, supra note 11, at 79; cf. Posner, supra note 18, at 1565
(arguing that it is much easier to sell a novel doctrine in the antitrust field to the
Court than to Congress—which may very well be the case when national authorities
begin to investigate and prosecute against algorithmic collusion).
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international detection cooperation, which will be vital before there is
ever enforcement cooperation against algorithmic cartels. 177
2. Lack of Identifying Liable Behaviors
The Recommendation fails to identify liable behaviors. 178 This has
led to legislative gaps across member nations, further reducing the
ability to achieve effective international enforcement cooperation. 179
Foremost, an enduring question hangs over the international antitrust
community—whether one should condemn a firm for behaving
rationally and developing, unilaterally, an algorithm that accounts for
publicly available information while operating interdependently on
the market? 180 If humans do not know whether, when, or for how long
177. See Third Report, supra note 55, at 31 (highlighting that successful
cooperation among global competition authorities includes tools and techniques for
the detection of cartels); Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 14
(noting algorithmic collusion will require a combination of both reactive and
proactive detection measures to be most effective—competition authorities have
typically relied on reactive tools such as leniency programs).
178. Current competition law forbids the means by which collusion is achieved—
liable behaviors—and not the collusive outcome. Liable behaviors in global
competition law include the “plus factors” in cases of parallel conduct, those who
knowingly continue to benefit from an illegal source of income, any form of
anticompetitive agreement, etc. See Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 29; Stucke &
Ezrachi, Computers Inhibit Competition, supra note 30, at 1804. In cases of
algorithmic collusion, parties may be liable for developing the algorithms or in
seeing the effects of algorithms, if they were (1) motivated to achieve an
anticompetitive outcome, or (2) aware of their actions’ natural and probable
anticompetitive consequences. Another possibility is framing algorithmic collusion
as an “abuse” of excessive transparency where there is apparent anticompetitive
intent among the firms or within the industry. However, “abuse of excessive
transparency” will require a more refined definition and understanding in order to
ensure compliance while not suppressing the benefits algorithms provide to
consumers and to the market. See Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and CounterMeasures, supra note 5, at 21.
179. The original purpose of the OECD’s Recommendation included eliminating
gaps in the coverage of competition law. Recommendation, supra note 4; Third
Report, supra note 55, at 46. The OECD’s recent and only report on algorithmic
collusion makes no reference to unification in approaches for detection,
investigation, and enforcement against algorithmic cartels. This calls into question
the likelihood and speed at which competition authorities will be able to come
together in order to ensure international comity does not suffer because cartels have
become more sophisticated. See generally Competition Policy in the Digital Age,
supra note 3.
180. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 80
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algorithms collude (assuming they do not), then is this even an area
for competition law enforcers to address? 181 The OECD’s
Recommendation for handling one of the most serious violations of
competition law does not offer an answer to either of these
questions. 182
The OECD must address two focal points of hard core cartel
enforcement to achieve optimal international cooperation in deterring
cartels. First, identifying illegal behavior—recognizing the line
between rational profit maximizing decisions and illegal behavior 183—
and second, what makes a person within a firm liable for
anticompetitive conduct. 184 Under the current competition
enforcement regimes, the absence of communication and an explicit
agreement among firms may not satisfy the intent and awareness

(debating whether the focus of competition authorities in cases of AI should be on
consumer welfare or the overall efficiencies and total welfare generated by the
technology); Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 19 (stating that
supra-competitive pricing strategies can be the natural outcome of rational economic
behavior by a single firm on the market).
181. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 78 (“We
can no longer assume that humans intended to create the conditions of tacit
collusion.”).
182. The OECD’s Recommendation never addresses which welfare standard (i.e.,
consumer or total) is the most effective in maintaining optimal competitive markets.
Further, it does not address “unconventional” cartels that are intentionally
sophisticated, so as to escape regulation. Does the profit-maximizing rationality of
the algorithm’s development and implementation remove any possible liability to
the programmer? The Recommendation oversimplifies the complexity these
questions introduce in achieving international cooperation. See generally
Recommendation, supra note 4.
183. Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 20 (“There is a grey
area of business behavior which goes beyond conscious parallelism but at the same
time does not involve an express agreement between competitors.”).
184. It is not enough to only identify liable means/behaviors, those who are
responsible for them must also be identified. This is easy in cases where a group of
executives agree to collude in secret because those executives are clearly liable.
However, this is much less clear in scenarios where no particular individual is
carrying out the collusive behavior, nor are the colluders aware they are colluding.
Yet, the collusive outcome—development, implementation, and execution—would
not have been possible absent human intervention (i.e., the initial deployment of the
algorithm). The Recommendation fails to clarify if there should be liability, and if
there is, who it falls on, in these types of scenarios. See generally Recommendation,
supra note 4.
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conditions necessary for finding illegality. 185
OECD roundtable discussions frame potential AI collusive
behaviors in various ways. 186 The highest standard a competition
enforcer could set in classifying illegality would be requiring proof of
the firm’s “abuse” of the markets’ excessive transparency, likely
revealing anticompetitive intent. 187 This becomes an impossible
standard because AI’s decision-making cannot be tracked nor is there
any clarity on the term “abuse” in this context. 188 Further, likely future
capabilities of algorithms make this an unrealistic standard. 189 Some
nations will likely consider AI collusion a strict liability crime because
of the challenges in detection and potentially heightened cartel
sustainability. 190 Framing illegality as any form of market
manipulation or as any involvement in unfair competitive practices
translates into a strict liability crime in algorithmic collusion
scenarios. 191 This greatly lowers the bar for enforcers. Because only
185. See Big Data, supra note 88, at 24 (screening algorithms is not a solution to
algorithmic collusion because firms can only be condemned if there is some
identifiable “intention” to collude); Stucke & Ezrachi, Computers Inhibit
Competition, supra note 30, at 1795 (arguing that there is likely a lack of “intent”
by developers and users to facilitate conscious parallelism—the firm is merely
relying on an AI strategy to optimize their position in the market).
186. See Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 39 (discussing
the scope of liability assigned to individuals and firms for a robo-seller’s actions
under current antitrust law).
187. Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 21.
188. AI operates with the intent to maximize profits while recognizing mutual
interdependency and readapting behavior to the actions of other market players—
not with the intent to collude. Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 23; see EZRACHI &
STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 37 (discussing how AI generates
anticompetitive outcomes absent anticompetitive intent).
189. See Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 27
(recognizing deep-learning algorithms’ significant ability to adjust to an everchanging environment and to engage in cognitively intensive tasks, making them a
superior tool for firms to determine market strategy); Stucke & Ezrachi, Pricing
Bots, supra note 47 (stating that scholars still do not fully understand the changes to
our markets and competitive ecosystem as we shift to the era of big data and
analytics).
190. See Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 26
(noting that the European Commission is currently considering a strict liability
regime); Stucke & Ezrachi, Computers Inhibit Competition, supra note 30, at 1803
(questioning whether companies can constrain their computer’s actions to avoid less
competitive outcomes if faced with strict liability for the computer’s actions).
191. The focus here is on firms’ use of advanced algorithms to transform market
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the largest firms (i.e., Google and Facebook) utilize deep-learning AI
due to its great cost, this results in high barriers to entry in particular
markets and makes it impossible for existing firms to compete. This
result alone could possibly be deemed an unfair competitive
practice. 192 Additionally, states with competition law enforcers
authorized to conduct dawn raids will likely use this tactical advantage
with algorithmic collusion scenarios—finding illegality through
market or sector investigations. 193 The wide scope of behavioral and
structural remedies under market investigations, that may otherwise
be unavailable, open the flood gates in enforcement tactics for these
nations. 194
conditions in a way that facilitates tacit collusion, thus creating a new market
dynamic through “artificial” means. This approach would be most relevant for the
United States under Section 5 of the FTC Act: “the FTC must show either (1)
evidence that defendants tacitly or expressly agreed to use pricing algorithms to
avoid competition, or (2) oppressiveness, such as (a) evidence of defendants’
anticompetitive intent or purpose or (b) the absence of an independent legitimate
business reason for the defendants’ conduct.” Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and
Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 20-21.
192. The biggest developers and implementers of AI include global technology
companies such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook. These companies further
strengthen their already strong market position by forcing competitors to adopt AI if
they ever want to compete in the same markets. See EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL
COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 21 (“As more online sellers use AI and pricing
algorithms, their rivals, to prevent being at a competitive disadvantage, will feel
greater pressures to develop ‘smart’ pricing algorithms themselves.”)
193. “In 2017, Russia’s RAS initiated dawn raids of LG Electronics Rus Ltd.,
Philips Ltd. and Sangfiy SES Electronics Rus Ltd. due to receiving complaints of
concerted actions by these enterprises in the sales of equipment. As of now, this
investigation continues.” Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], Algorithms
and Collusion - Note by the Russian Federation, at 4, DAF/COMP/WD(2017)22
(May 15, 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)22/en/pdf
[hereinafter Note by the Russian Federation]. Dawn raids are not a tool available to
United States competition authorities, but they are available in the jurisdictions of
the European Union, Brazil, India, and China. The United States utilizes warrants
for searches and seizures. See generally JONES DAY, HOW TO SURVIVE DAWN RAIDS
AND SEARCH WARRANT INVESTIGATIONS IN ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION LAW
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS (2016), https://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/
0ab2c15a-c068-4029-afc1-bb51990d9d1b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
a1300b6e-ed88-4252-b6bf-37371e2f1ac7/How%20to%20Survive%20Dawn%20
Raids.pdf.
194. See e.g., Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5,
at 22 (explaining how the United Kingdom Competition and Market Authority can
impose structural or behavioral remedies).
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Where to assign liability once collusive behavior has been identified
creates another gaping issue. 195 The OECD barely touches the topic of
assigning liability for traditional cartels, and the issue only amplifies
when the guilty cartelists are robots and no human decision making is
involved. 196 Most intuitively, liability under algorithmic cartels could
be assigned to the algorithm’s creators, users, or benefiters. 197 The
Recommendation only identifies “firms” and “individuals” as liable
actors, providing no direction on the most effective liability
assignments to deter algorithmic cartels or any unconventional
cartels. 198
As AI continues to develop, the links between the algorithm and the
human developer become weaker and the ability of algorithms to act
and price autonomously puts in question the liability of the individuals
who benefit from the algorithms’ autonomous decisions. 199 In such
cases, liability will most likely be determined on a case-by-case basis
with no real uniformity, but this is unsatisfactory when global
competition authorities attempt to cooperate consistently. 200
195. Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 36.
196. Two possible legal approaches to a liability regime include: (1) a riskgenerating approach—”liability would be assigned to the actors generating a major
risk for others and benefitting from the relevant device, product or service”—and (2)
a risk-management approach—”liability is assigned to the market actor which is best
placed to minimize or avoid the realisation of the risk or to amortize the costs in
relation to those risks”—both of which are being considered by the European
Commission. Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at
26.
197. Creators include programmers and third-party centers; users include general
level managers and commercial applications; benefiters include shareholders and
executives. Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 36.
198. The only mention of liability—not expressly, but by reading in between the
lines—assigns responsibility to “firms and individuals” by calling for effective
sanctions to deter their engagement in cartels. Recommendation, supra note 4.
199. See Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 35 (noting a weak link between the
agent (algorithm) and the principal (human being)); Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra
note 12, at 5 (discussing how the connection between humans and computers
weakens as AI develops further and is able to act and price more autonomously).
200. See Posner, supra note 18, at 1601 (noting exceptional situations that have
to be treated on a case-by-case basis because guidelines are not particularly helpful).
Today, scenarios of algorithmic collusion are still rare (exceptional) and AI
collusion has not yet been detected in any market, making a case-by-case analysis
reasonable and expected. However, as AI proliferates in global markets, a case-bycase analysis will only further complicate enforcement as competition authorities
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3. The Trickle-Down Effects on Enforcement
Finally, the Recommendation fails to develop a consistent approach
to unconventional cartels, especially where conduct has cross-border
implications. 201 Today, no clear line exists globally to separate a civil
violation from a criminal one, thus creating inevitable gaps in
enforcement. 202 When national competition authorities lack
international cooperation in detecting and identifying liable parties,
particularly in criminal investigations, challenges in international
enforcement cooperation come as no surprise. Furthermore, the
unanswered questions and unaddressed obstacles of the most effective
enforcement to deter unconventional cartels formed via innovative
methods (i.e., AI) results in not only unlikely, but nearly impossible,
successful international cooperation. 203
The various possible approaches to enforcement against AI
algorithmic cartels have become apparent because countries are
already taking them. 204 OECD non-member nations Russia, Brazil,
India, and China, have either recognized they have ineffective antitrust
laws, are slowly attempting to pave the pathway to effective
enforcement, or are entirely silent on the issue, begging the question

will completely lack any uniformity and have no cooperation guidelines for related
investigations. See generally Big Data, supra note 88, at 15.
201. See Tom Madge-Wyld, Unconventional Cartel Conduct Needs Harmonized
Enforcement, Lawyers Say, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV. (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/usa/1167828/unconventional-cartelconduct-needs-harmonised-enforcement-lawyers-say (quoting Cleary Gottlieb
Hamilton & Steen partner Mark Nelson) (“It is critical, as much as possible, for
antitrust enforcers globally to get on the same page, particularly in what we were
referring to as unconventional cartel conduct . . . [e]specially where conduct is
global in scope or has cross-border implications.”).
202. This makes it difficult for global firms to ensure compliance. See id.
203. When nations are unable to establish a common platform or even a common
goal, competition regulation, then international cooperation, becomes less helpful
and thus less common. The OECD’s failure to address the need to establish a
common goal when new challenges arise to competition authorities, particularly
when egregious harm could result, has been made apparent as competition
authorities flounder to determine how and if they should regulate algorithmic
collusion.
204. This Part III(B)(3), is devoted to addressing the gaps in antitrust regulation
made apparent by the divergent approaches taken by each nation in relation to AI
enforcement.
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of whether these nations are addressing the issue at all. 205 OECD
member economic regions—the United States and the European
Union—apparently have discussed the issues of algorithmic collusion
enforcement but it does not appear they have discussed it with one
another. 206 Rather, the global gap in antitrust law enforcement
continues to widen when authorities once celebrated it closing. 207
Russia was the only non-member nation to submit a report to the
OECD’s roundtable discussion on algorithmic collusion. 208 Russia’s
FAS report provides an optimal example of the current incapacity for
effective international enforcement in AI algorithmic collusion
scenarios. Current Russian antimonopoly legislation solely concerns
“economic entities, organizations, authorities and individual persons”
and thus collusion via algorithmic software surely results in more
sustainable cartels than ever before because it falls outside the scope
of current regulation. 209 Further, Russia even points to the recurring
difficulty of determining the responsibility of computer engineers
when they program “intelligent” machines. 210
FAS’s utilization of dawn raids via a market investigation of the
giant global technology companies LG Electronics Rus Ltd., Philips
Ltd. and Sangfiy SES Electronics Rus Ltd., is an unattainable method
205. See infra notes 208-224.
206. See Leah Nylen & Matthew Newman, Views on Algorithms and Competition
Law Expose EU-US divide, MLEX (May 26, 2017), https://mlexmarketinsight.com/
insights-center/editors-picks/antitrust/cross-jurisdiction/views-on-algorithms-andcompetition-law-expose-eu-us-divide (arguing that the European Union has already
drawn a tougher line on regulating technology, compared to the United States, which
has taken a backseat approach in cases of AI).
207. As this section discusses, the world’s largest economies are taking divergent
approaches in their view of regulating AI algorithmic collusion. The
Recommendation’s Third Report celebrated the closing of the enforcement gap,
when it comes to hard core cartels, and discussed nations trending in this direction.
See Third Report, supra note 55, at 30 (highlighting that many of the trends in
enforcement led to international cooperation reaching unprecedented levels).
208. Russia was the only non-member in the context of this paper to submit a
report—other non-member nations included Ukraine and Singapore, with the
Business and Industry Advisory Committee also submitting an individual report. See
generally Russian Federation, supra note 193.
209. Id. at 2.
210. Russia’s approach to this problem (whether humans are liable for “smart”
computers’ decisions) is not clarified, but it is singled out as one of the largest issues
facing competition authorities. See id. at 4.
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to many other global competition authorities. 211 Thus, this cannot be
the sole method relied upon to detect or enforce against algorithmic
cartels if the hope is to push towards global enforcement cooperation.
A hopeful light, however, on international enforcement cooperation
comes from Brazil’s Administrative Council for Economic Defense
(CADE) expectation to strengthen enforcement over various
competition issues being discussed by North American agencies and
the EC, including the challenges of big data. 212 CADE’s recent
investigations into online hotel booking platforms, such as
Booking.com and Expedia, and three separate investigations into
Google’s practices in the Brazilian search market, highlights their
drive towards international cooperation and alignment with
international competition authority timing deadlines. 213
Despite CADE’s notable developments in international
enforcement cooperation and overall hard core cartel enforcement, the
agency’s complete silence on algorithmic collusion is deafening.
CADE’s Multiannual Plan, with detailed targets for 2016-2019 and
identified initiatives, never once mentions algorithmic collusion and

211. See id. Although a majority of the jurisdictions analyzed in this paper (every
economic region aside from the United States) are authorized to initiate dawn raids,
this is not a uniform global approach to investigations into anticompetitive
behaviors, and there is no evidence that is will ever become one—primarily because
the United States utilizes warrants to conduct “search and seizures” when conducting
criminal investigations. See generally JONES DAY, supra note 193.
212. Barbosa Müssnich Aragão, Abuse of Dominance Enforcement-What’s Next?,
LEXOLOGY (June 14, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
0e1af2d7-56c8-4bf9-9a0e-c94ab4faa7d7; accord John Bodrug, Interview with
Alexandre Barreto, President of Brazil’s Administrative Council for Economic
Defense (CADE), AM. BAR ASS’N: ANTITRUST SOURCE 5 (Mar. 29, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/multimedia/antitrust_law/jun18_bar
reto_intrvw_6_21f.authcheckdam.pdf (including commentary by Alexandre
Barreto, President of CADE since 2017, on CADE’s investment in big data,
econometric, and other mining tools to improve investigative capacity, although all
projects are still in the beta version).
213. Press Release, CADE, Booking, Decolar, and Expedia Reach Cease and
Desist Agreement with CADE (Mar. 29, 2018), http://en.cade.gov.br/pressreleases/booking-decolar-and-expedia-reach-cease-and-desist-agreement-with-thebrazilian-administrative-council-for-economic-defense; Jeff Zalesin, Brazil
Continues Google Antitrust Probe Without Microsoft, LAW360 (May 5, 2016,
3:41PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/792935/brazil-continues-googleantitrust-probe-without-microsoft.
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innovative cartel development. 214 Brazil’s absence from the
algorithmic collusion “conversation” is especially concerning because
it is a nation that prides itself on being the “best” competition regulator
in the Americas for being the most innovative with soft law and most
proactive in international cooperation. 215
India has been just as silent as Brazil, but not absent speculation.
The CCI recently announced its intentions to open an investigation
into the anticompetitive effects of algorithmic airline ticket pricing
models—unsurprisingly, the details of the investigations are not
public. Karan Singh Chandiok, a partner at Chadhiok & Associates in
New Delhi, mentioned that this investigation is certainly raising
questions of the proper legal standard and how to view the traditional
ideas of an “agreement.” 216 Chadhiok also mentioned that the CCI is
looking to develop a cyber lab to better understand types of
algorithmic pricing methods and their effects on various markets and
overall competition. 217 The CCI has declined to comment on any of
these observations. 218
Most recently, the CCI imposed heavy penalties on Google for
abusing its dominant market position through promoting its own
verticals at the expense of competitors. 219 The outcome of this
214. The initiative focuses on strengthening cartel combat policy through the
integrated use of information and the institutionalization of partnerships with
international bodies and other administrative bodies, but it never addresses the
creative means by which these cartels are being formed, and divergent approaches
by nations makes it more difficult to enter into effective agreements. See
Multiannual Plan-PPA, CADE, http://en.cade.gov.br/topics/actions-and-programs
(last visited Jan. 21, 2019) (noting the overall objective is “[t]o strengthen
competition defense and consumer protection through the expansion of the scale and
the effectiveness of public policies”).
215. For the fifth consecutive year, CADE has received four stars in the annual
ranking promoted by the British magazine Global Competition Review Rating
Enforcement, which specializes in regulation and competition policy. Press Release,
CADE, CADE Remains Among the Best Antitrust Agencies of the World (Aug. 21,
2017), http://en.cade.gov.br/press-releases/cade-remains-among-the-best-antitrustagencies-of-the-world.
216. Malina McLennan, India to Probe Airline Ticket Algorithms, GLOBAL
COMPETITION REV. (May 15, 2018), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/
1169614/india-to-probe-airline-ticket-algorithms.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Avinash M. Tripathi, Designing Competition Policies for the Age of AI,
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investigation raises further interest in how India will approach the
problems AI algorithmic collusion poses, as Google leads the world in
investing in and developing AI technology. 220 India’s approach to
algorithmic collusion is likely to influence China’s, and vice versa,
making this massive global economy vital to the development of
proper enforcement in this area.
The NDRC and SAIC have both been silent on China’s approach to
AI algorithmic collusion enforcement challenges and were absent
from the most recent OECD roundtable discussions on the issue—
which speaks volumes coming from one of the world’s largest
economies. The Chinese University of Hong Kong Business School,
however, recently published Rob Nicholls’s 221 work in relation to
concerns that competition in digital markets could be compromised if
AI bots take control of pricing. Yet, the article never addresses China’s
potential or suggested approaches but rather solely focuses on
approaches discussed by Australian competition law enforcers. 222
Despite the greatly intensified efforts of the NDRC and SAIC on
non-merger antitrust enforcement, it is important to recognize the
possible fatality to global markets resulting from their silence and lack
of addressing the challenges AI algorithms pose. Manipulated Chinese
markets almost certainly result in manipulated global trade— the
NDRC and the SAIC’s cooperation in enforcement is necessary. 223
(Mar. 9, 2018, 6:13AM), https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/
cgb8hI830DpAIzuLCQ2ZaP/Designing-competition-policies-for-the-age-ofAI.html.
220. Id. (highlighting that CCI’s investigation into Google may be used to
broaden sectoral challenges and noting that smart regulation will be key to
harnessing the benefits of AI for consumers and firms while optimizing the
competitive environment).
221. Rob Nicholls is currently a senior lecturer and competition law expert at
University of New South Wales (UNSW) business school and a research fellow at
the Centre for Law, Market and Regulation at UNSW Law in Sydney, Australia.
CUHK Business School, What if Bots Collide and Collude in Setting Prices?, CHINA
BUS. KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 16, 2017), https://cbk.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/what-if-botscollide-and-collude-in-setting-prices/.
222. See id. (focusing on Australian competition authorities and their approach,
lacking any acknowledgement of China’s possible view of algorithmic collusion and
the role of competition enforcement).
223. China is the world’s second largest economy and the world’s fastest growing
economy. Specifically, China’s digital economy has experienced a “boom” and
LIVEMINT
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Current OECD members calling upon young competition authority
agencies to immediately develop into leaders on issues of
unconventional cartels simply will not suffice and will not be
successful. 224
The two OECD member regions discussed in this paper, the
European Union and the United States, are far from being on the same
page in their enforcement approaches to algorithmic collusion. 225 The
European Union consistently warns that algorithms and automated
pricing bots create competition concerns. 226 EC Commissioner
Vestager stated that companies may face higher fines if they
implement software to facilitate their cartel. 227 Individual European
Union nations, including France and Germany, identified algorithmic
collusion as a top priority and the biggest challenge to competition
authorities. 228 German Chancellor Merkel has gone so far as to demand
a firm’s algorithms be made public in order to have the highest level
accounts for forty-two percent of the global e-commerce market. By 2050, it is
predicted that both China and India will overtake the United States in economic size
and growth. See Smith, supra note 127.
224. These young competition authorities (particularly China and India) have
focused their efforts on developing the proper agencies, regulation, investigatory and
regulatory techniques, and their role in international enforcement cooperation and
comity. See discussion supra Part II(C) (describing the evolution of these
competition authorities over the past decade). Asking these nations to be thought
leaders in the area of AI collusion, when they only recently began regulating the
most traditional and egregious forms of anticompetitive behavior, logically will not
result in an effective and sustainable approach for the global antitrust community.
225. See Nylen & Newman, supra note 206 (explaining that European authorities
have been much more active in their investigations by reviewing Google, Facebook,
and Amazon algorithms and their effects on consumer markets, while the United
States has taken the position that AI, as they know it today, is just another form of
legal tacit collusion).
226. See Vestager, supra note 57.
227. See id. at 8 (“If those tools allow companies to enforce their cartels more
strictly, we may need to reflect that in the fines that we impose.”); Nylen & Newman,
supra note 206 (“Vestager warned companies in March that they may face higher
fines if they use software tools as part of their cartels.”).
228. See Nylen & Newman, supra note 206 (highlighting the French Competition
Authority naming the digital economy as the number one problem in competition
policy and Germany’s cartel office referencing the impact of digital companies on
the economy as a “new land” for competition agencies); Pricing Algorithms: The
Digital Collusion Scenarios, supra note 22, at 5 (noting that French and German
authorities issued a joint report on algorithmic pricing and its anticompetitive
affects).
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of accountability when it comes to the algorithms’ deployed use
cases. 229 The European Union’s recent implementation of the GDPR,
which Commissioner Vestager points to as an important tool in
properly deterring algorithmic cartels, highlights the region’s
productivity. 230
The United States has taken the entirely opposite approach of “wait
and see” while consistently noting the legality of tacit collusion in the
United States. 231 United States Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Barry Nigro explained that concerns around algorithmic price fixing
stem from a lack of understanding of the technology. 232 He further said
it would be difficult to imagine how a scenario of algorithmic
collusion could be illegal without an agreement because it would
almost always fall into the realm of legal conscious parallelism. 233 This
approach in light of AI’s capabilities in facilitating collusion is
incredibly concerning and lacks any urgency from the world’s largest
economy and a major player in global trade. The United States’
“attempt” to match the European Union’s productivity in deterring
algorithmic cartels comes in the form of a new Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Office of Technology Research and Investigation
responsible for studying algorithmic transparency. 234 However, United
229. “The algorithms must be made public, so that one can inform oneself as an
interested citizen on questions like: what influences my behavior on the internet and
that of others? . . . These algorithms, when they are not transparent, can lead to a
distortion of our perception, they narrow our breadth of information.” Capobianco
et al., supra note 2, at 43 (citing Chancellor Merkel’s public statement).
230. “And I think the EU’s new rules on data protection, which will come into
force next year, give us valuable ideas about how we can face that challenge. The
concept of ‘data protection by design’ makes clear that people’s privacy can never
be an afterthought. It has to be built into the way that services work from the very
start. That’s also how businesses need to think when they design and use algorithms.
They may not always know exactly how an automated system will use its algorithms
to take decisions. What businesses can—and must—do is to ensure antitrust
compliance by design. That means pricing algorithms need to be built in a way that
doesn’t allow them to collude.” Vestager, supra note 57, at 8.
231. Nylen & Newman, supra note 206.
232. Pallavi Guniganti, US DOJ Deputy: Algorithmic Cartel Requires Agreement,
GLOBAL COMPETITION REV. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/
article/1153380/us-doj-deputy-algorithmic-cartel-requires-agreement
(quoting
Barry Nigro).
233. Id.
234. Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 43.
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States FTC Chairman Maureen Ohlhausen expressed skepticism
regarding the need for any intervention by antitrust enforcers in this
area, bringing into question the role of the new FTC office. 235
The gaps in enforcement approaches of the world’s largest
competition authorities are apparent and identifiable. Due to the
introduction of algorithmic collusion, the OECD’s role in facilitating
international cooperation and comity becomes more necessary today
than it was twenty years ago when the Organization formed its
Recommendation. There cannot and will not be effective international
enforcement cooperation until nations unify their approaches to
algorithmic collusion detection and liability.

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Effective international cooperation and comity in the deterrence,
detection, and enforcement against hard core cartels requires
modifications to the OECD’s current Recommendation. First, the
OECD needs to adopt a formal definition of what encompasses an
anticompetitive agreement, as it does with the term “hard core cartel.”
Second, it is vital to (1) push for international cooperation in detection,
not just enforcement, and (2) identify liable behaviors and parties.

A. THE OECD NEEDS TO ADOPT A FORMAL DEFINITION OF WHAT
ENCOMPASSES AN ANTICOMPETITIVE AGREEMENT, CONCERTED
PRACTICE, AND ARRANGEMENT.
The defining boundaries of what constitutes an agreement lays the
foundation for the various global approaches to algorithmic collusion.
Any behavior in oligopolistic markets absent an agreement, whether
or not firms generate an anticompetitive outcome, traditionally falls
within the law (tacit collusion). 236 An express agreement, however, is
235. “There is nothing inherently suspect about using computer algorithms to look
carefully at the world around you before participating in markets,” Ohlhausen said.
“From my perspective, if conduct was unlawful before, using an algorithm to
effectuate it will not magically transform it into lawful behavior. Likewise, using
algorithms in ways that do not offend traditional antitrust norms is unlikely to create
novel liability scenarios.” Nylen & Newman, supra note 206.
236. See Pricing Algorithms: The Digital Collusion Scenarios, supra note 22, at
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not so easily identified and courts across the world have accepted
different interpretations in order to effectively deter anticompetitive
outcomes in markets. 237 This includes the “plus factors” taken with
conscious parallelism in oligopolistic markets being interpreted equal
to a formal agreement. 238 But as technology continues to progress,
agreements become more sophisticated and unique to each cartel and
the “oligopoly problem” extends beyond traditional oligopolistic
markets. National competition authorities now face more divergent
paths in interpreting the meaning of an “anticompetitive agreement,
concerted practice, and arrangement.” Specifically, nations have
begun to diverge on whether a computer program is capable of
forming an agreement, absent human intervention or knowledge —
the Recommendation lends no hand to answering (or even discussing)
this question. 239
The first step in creating international cooperation in this area
requires a unified understanding of the term “agreement” so countries
know how to properly identify illegal AI algorithmic collusion
scenarios. A nation that believes a computer can form an agreement
has nothing to gain by cooperating with a nation that requires human
intervention. The lack of unification leads to true divergence in the
fundamental understanding of how to best protect a competitive
ecosystem in the digital economy. The “agreement” among cartelists,
human or AI, is the foundation of the criminality of the cartel and gives
competition authorities the ability to effectively halt and deter the
egregious harm done to world trade. 240 Without a mutual goal and
understanding among global competition authorities, while AI and
4 (“Under current rules, the tacit collusion scenario (i.e., ‘conscious parallelism’
which establishes itself without a need to collude actively) does not lead to an
antitrust offence being committed, so companies do not have to worry about it just
yet.”); cf. Price-bots Can Collude Against Consumers, supra note 29 (arguing that
algorithmic pricing “is a recipe for tacit collusion of the kind found on Martha’s
Vineyard”).
237. See Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note 5, at 26
(emphasizing “antitrust enforcers (even with an attractive leniency policy) have had
a hard time detecting express collusion”).
238. Cf. Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 4 (noting algorithms could be
considered “plus factors” as an adjustment to current antitrust laws).
239. See generally Recommendation, supra note 4.
240. Id.; Third Report, supra note 55, at 14, 16, 26.
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human cartelists maintain one, international enforcement cooperation
will surely suffer, alongside global consumers.
Anticompetitive agreements can no longer exist only under the
traditional “meeting of the minds” or fall under the traditional “plus
factors” of industries susceptible to collusion. The increased market
transparency and frequency of interaction in our digital economy
inevitably makes more industries susceptible to collusion that
authorities have not before faced. 241 AI replicates, possibly exceeds,
human intelligence and makes decisions with incredible efficiency,
without the hindrance of emotions, all while having a God-like view
of the global market that a human would never be able to achieve. 242
A “meeting of the algorithms” serves as an effective definition for the
OECD to analyze for its Recommendation. 243
A “meeting of the algorithms” definition does not solely target
computer behavior, but rather the anticompetitive behaviors
committed by all cartels—responding to one another’s actions,
completely aware of the anticompetitive outcome, and intentionally
manipulating global markets. 244 Cartels will only continue to become
more sophisticated—an age-old concept to competition authorities. AI
cartels’ potential manipulations to global markets demands proactive,
not reactive, measures from authorities. This requires the OECD to
begin facilitating international comity and cooperation now in fighting
AI cartels, not after the world has witnessed how sustainable an AI
cartel can be when national authorities take divergent approaches.
Creating a unified definition for “agreement” on behalf of the
international antitrust community begins to bridge divergent
approaches.

241. Competition Policy in the Digital Age, supra note 3, at 7.
242. EZRACHI & STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION, supra note 9, at 71; see also
Christensen, supra note 58, at 7.
243. See analysis supra Part III(A) (discussing a “meeting of the algorithms”).
244. See generally Capobianco et al., supra note 2, at 32-34 (discussing where the
legal definition of an “agreement” fits into AI scenarios through a “meeting of the
algorithms”).
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B. THE OECD NEEDS TO ADOPT AMENDMENTS TO THEIR
RECOMMENDATION INCLUDING: (1) LIABLE BEHAVIOR AND LIABLE
PARTY IDENTIFIERS, AND (2) GUIDING INTERNATIONAL DETECTION
COOPERATION.
Understanding how to identify the liable parties, and what behaviors
create liability, proves to be another obstacle vital to overcome to
effectively deter algorithmic cartels. The anticompetitive behaviors
that define criminality, or even those that face high civil fines, lay the
foundation for how national competition authorities believe their
competitive environment is best maintained, for the benefit of firms
and consumers. This also defines the level of responsibility expected
of firms within an economic region to prevent anticompetitive
outcomes.
In the case of algorithmic collusion, as mentioned in the analysis,
European Commissioner Vestager believes that programmers must
ensure “compliance by design” 245 of algorithms, meaning safeguards
must be put in place to ensure the implemented AI does not collude.
The United States has made no indication of its willingness to assign
such liability to AI programmers. 246 Understanding what roles
individuals play in a firm and what level of knowledge is required to
be “liable” of illegal behavior will likely be a key point in cases of AI
collusion.
This understanding is necessary to properly monitor and detect
susceptible markets where algorithmic collusion will likely take place.
A lack of mutual ground on what human behaviors involved with the
implementation of AI makes them liable and at what level in a firm
245. Pricing Algorithms: The Digital Collusion Scenarios, supra note 22, at 3.
“Compliance by design” parallels to the GDPR’s demand for “privacy by design”—
the concept that whenever something new is created or developed with any
relationship to personal data, it must be created in such a way that data privacy is
intrinsic to it. See GDPR Privacy by Design made Simple, PRIVACY TRUST,
https://privacytrust.com/gdpr/gdpr-privacy-by-design-made-simple.html
(last
visited Jan. 21, 2019). The origins of this lies in accessibility by design—personal
data are not accessible without the individual’s intervention. See Data Protection by
Design and Default, INFO. COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, https://ico.org.uk/fororganisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/accountabilityand-governance/data-protection-by-design-and-default/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
246. See analysis supra Part III(B)(3) (discussing the United States’ seeming lack
of concern about AI collusion and deeming it mere tacit collusion).
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accountability should be held (i.e., programmers or executives) leads
to regions taking, again, completely divergent approaches in their
investigation and compromises the effectiveness of proper
international enforcement. 247
The manipulation of global markets requires the joint efforts of
global authorities—not only in enforcement but also in detection. 248
The OECD’s Recommendation fails to address the importance of
international cooperation in detection—a vital part of tackling an AI
cartel. The world has yet to experience an AI cartel, but it is hard to
imagine that it will be contained within conventional borders. Thus,
the ability to detect an AI cartel domestically will likely impact many
economic regions, and the ability to cooperate on these detection
methods will be vital to understanding the extent and reach to which
markets are manipulated.
The OECD approaching international detection cooperation via
revamped and unified leniency programs is likely to be well received
by competition authorities across the globe. It is also likely to be the
most efficient approach to detecting AI collusion. Due to the
anticipated difficulty in detecting AI’s anticompetitive behaviors,
leniency enforcement programs will play a vital role in algorithmic
cartel detection. 249 Since the implementation of the OECD’s
Recommendation, leniency programs have developed across national
competition authority regimes. 250 Increased incentives for
knowledgeable parties to step forward in AI collusion scenarios will
undeniably be relied upon by enforcers, as it has proven successful in
the past. 251 These increased incentives could be effectively
247. See Capobianco & Gonzaga, supra note 12, at 5 (“Some commentators have
suggested that when dealing with a robot engaging in anti-competitive conducts
there are three possible ways of attributing responsibility: to the robot itself, to the
humans who deploy it, or to no one.”).
248. Third Report, supra note 55, at 3.
249. See analysis supra Part III(B)(1).
250. See Third Report, supra note 55, at 9-12 (noting the improvements to
leniency programs by signatories to the Recommendation).
251. Shortly after the adoption of a leniency program and the creation of the
Special Unit for Combating Cartels, the German Cartel Office received information
from the construction industry about suspected cartel activity among cement
producers. Evidence seized during a nation-wide search of thirty cement companies
in July 2002, and during further searches of several small and medium-sized cement
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implemented by merging whistleblower rewards with current leniency
programs used by competition authorities. 252 OECD reports
consistently include leniency programs and there is no reason they
should be absent from the OECD’s enforcement Recommendation. 253
The OECD’s role, first and foremost, in the area of competition
regulation and enforcement is to guide international cooperation and
comity. Adopting amendments that unify liability identifiers and guide
methods for detection cooperation across borders facilitates this role
and leads to positive trickle-down results on enforcement. Thus,
hopefully, further reducing the possibility for international gaps in
antitrust laws.

V. CONCLUSION
The OECD’s Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective
Action Against Hard Core Cartels is insufficient to effectively
promote international comity with the novel challenges algorithmic
collusion presents to competition authorities. 254 Oligopolistic markets
manufacturers in 2003, confirmed that the investigated cement producers had
operated anti-competitive market allocation and quota agreements. Some of them
had been doing this since the 1970s, and continued to do so until 2002, in four
regional cement markets in eastern Germany, Westphalia, northern Germany, and
southern Germany. Id. at 14. Sanctions against individuals also can increase the
effectiveness of leniency programs as they are a powerful incentive for individuals
to reveal information about existing cartels and to cooperate in investigations. Id. at
26.
252. “Current leniency programs target guilty parties through offering amnesty,
rather than targeting the rest of the population through positive rewards. The main
virtue of private monitoring in antitrust is that it gives power to those closest to
behavior that, by its nature, is secretive. Obtaining an insider’s knowledge of cartel
behavior would not only lead to an increase in prosecution numbers, but it would
also enable a whistleblower to identify collusive behavior at a lower cost than
external monitoring by competition enforcers.” Jonathan Wright, Blow the Whistle:
How Bringing Whistleblower Rewards to Antitrust Would Help Cartel Enforcement,
3 ADMIN. L. REV. 695, 716 (2017).
253. See generally Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], Fighting HardCore Cartels: Harm, Effective Sanctions and Leniency Programs (2002),
https://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/1841891.pdf (recognizing numerous
leniency programs throughout report); see generally Third Report, supra note 55
(noting major improvements to national leniency programs and their role in
preventing cartels).
254. The OECD, in a 2016 report, commented that these strategies “may pose
serious challenges to competition authorities in the future, as it may be very difficult,
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have become more vulnerable to tacit collusion as the digital economy
grows due to increased market transparency and frequency of
interaction among market players. Deep-learning AI algorithms
amplify the negative outcomes of tacit collusion, causing more
distortions in world trade and market power than traditional hard core
cartels. The global nature of algorithmic cartels demands that the
OECD fulfills its role of guiding effective international cooperation
and comity, which is not possible under the current Recommendation.
The already occurring gaps in approaching the detection and
enforcement of algorithmic cartels could result in little to no
possibility of timely and successful international enforcement
cooperation. Unless the OECD addresses the need to unify
competition law to effectively deter algorithmic cartels, international
comity in cartel enforcement will suffer when it was just beginning to
thrive, and our global economy will witness the most sustainable and
destructive cartels that authorities have ever faced.

if not impossible, to prove an intention to coordinate prices, at least using current
antitrust tools.” See Ezrachi & Stucke, Problems and Counter-Measures, supra note
5, at 19 (describing firms’ ability to undercut prices of competitors through direct
communications with buyers).

